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DETAINING ISIS: HABEAS
AND THE PHANTOM MENACE
ERNESTO HERNÁNDEZ-LÓPEZ*
Abstract
The United States detained “John Doe,” an American citizen, in Iraq
without charges for over a year. He was released in October of 2018.
Challenging this detention, Doe filed a habeas petition. He argued that the
detention was illegal because statutory authority is needed to detain
citizens, and military detention depends upon Congress formally
authorizing the anti-ISIS conflict. Doe contended that these conditions did
not exist. The United States argued that the detention was legal because
Doe was an enemy combatant that supported ISIS in Syria. This case, Doe
v. Mattis, raised significant constitutional questions about citizens,
executive detention, and deference in national-security and foreignrelations matters. But much more remains at stake in terms of overseas
power and military force.
This Article argues that Doe’s prolonged detention is the expected result
of legal ambiguities of American authority overseas. Extraterritoriality
questions force courts to determine what law applies outside domestic
borders. Doe v. Mattis continued inquiries from Guantánamo detentions. A
decade ago, the focus was on Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and alien detainees in
territory under American control. Doe v. Mattis posed subsequent issues
regarding executive power, citizen detention, overseas habeas rights, and
whether Congress authorized the ISIS conflict. This Article uses postcolonial and TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law)
perspectives to examine military detention. These perspectives identify how
prior legal reasoning shapes overseas authority. With Doe v. Mattis’s
rulings on executive power, military detention can adapt for new conflicts
with changing enemies and no envisioned end.
* Professor of Law, Fowler School of Law, Chapman University,
ehernand@chapman.edu, http://ssrn.com/author=522295. The author thanks Deans Matt
Parlow and Donald Kochan for the support; Sherry Leysen and Matthew Flynn of the Hugh
and Hazel Darling Law Library for the research support; Mario Barnes, Sudha Setty, and
David Glazier for draft comments; and suggestions from participants of the AALS New
Voices in Human Rights Panel, Southern California International Law Scholars Workshop,
Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, WLPOC/CAPALF at UNLV Law School,
and the Indiana University McKinney School of Law Executive Branch symposium.
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On or around September 12, 2017, an American citizen surrendered
himself to the Syrian Democratic Forces (“SDF”) somewhere near the
Syria-Turkey border.1 His actual name was not disclosed officially, so he is
known as “John Doe.” The New York Times, however, identified him.2 The
SDF transferred him to American forces, who, along with the SDF, are part
of an allied coalition fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”).
Doe remained in American military detention from September 2017 to
1. ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Betsy
Woodruff & Spencer Ackerman, U.S. Military: American Fighting for ISIS ‘Surrenders,’
DAILY BEAST (Sept. 14, 2017, 10:30 AM ET), https://www.thedailybeast.com/us-militaryamerican-isis-fighter-reportedly-surrenders.
2. This Article utilizes the name John Doe because court records and opinions use this
name. Comparing ISIS and American police records, the New York Times reports that "his
real name is Abdulrahman Ahmad Alsheikh." Charlie Savage, Rukmini Callimachi & Eric
Schmitt, American ISIS Suspect Is Freed After Being Held More Than a Year, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/us/politics/isis-john-doe-releasedabdulrahman-alsheikh.html.
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October 2018, over a year, without actually being charged with a crime. 3
Soon after news of his detention, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a
petition of habeas corpus on his behalf challenging the legality of his
detention.4 In this dispute, Doe v. Mattis, the appellate court affirmed5
district-court orders6 barring Doe’s forced transfer to another country. As
Doe waited for proceedings to determine if his detention was legal, on June
6, 2018, the Government notified the district court that it intended to return
Doe to Syria, where he was captured, even though it was still mired in civil
war.7 Meanwhile, his custody passed the one-year mark without any
proceedings or rulings on the legality of his detention. On October 28,
pursuant to a settlement, Doe was transferred to Bahrain, where he would
be free and able to keep his American citizenship but would have his
American passport revoked.8
3. See Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Secures Release of American Citizen Unlawfully
Detained by Trump Administration (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclusecures-release-american-citizen-unlawfully-detained-trump-administration-0
[hereinafter
ACLU Press Release]; see cf. Bobby Chesney, What Will America Do with the U.S. Citizen
It Is Holding as an Enemy Combatant?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 15, 2017, 4:49 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/15/what-will-america-do-with-the-u-s-citizen-it-isholding-as-an-enemy-combatant/.
4. ACLU Found., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 55.
5. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued its decision on May 7, 2018.
Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
6. On January 23, 2018, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia required
that the Government provide seventy-two hours’ notice before transferring Doe. Doe v.
Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195, 197 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Charlie Savage, Military Ordered
to Notify A.C.L.U. Before Transferring American ISIS Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/us/politics/american-isis-suspect-transfer-rulingaclu.html.
7. No court entertained the merits of claims that Doe is an enemy combatant and that
the Executive Branch has military authority to detain ISIS combatants. See Doe, 889 F.3d at
747–49. For description, by Doe’s lead attorney, of the Government’s suggested release, see
Jonathan Hafetz, The Trump Administration Wants to Dump a Detained American into One
of the Most Dangerous Places on Earth, ACLU: SPEAK FREELY (June 7, 2018, 3:45 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/detention/trump-administration-wants-dumpdetained-american-one-most. For an analysis of what a “proposal to release him in Syria”
means, see Alexia Ramirez & Sara Robinson, United States Attempts to Abandon Citizen in
War Zone, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 27, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/
blog/united-states-attempts-abandon-citizen-war-zone.
8. Doe’s attorney explains that Doe has not been officially identified and that his
release comes after the Government had no options when it could not justify the legality of
his detention in court. See Jonathan Hafetz, U.S. Citizen, Detained Without Charge by
Trump Administration for a Year, Is Finally Free, ACLU BLOG: SPEAK FREELY (Oct. 29,
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This Article describes Doe v. Mattis’s basic legal rulings, their
constitutional significance, and their role in continuing flexible approaches
to overseas American authority. In habeas filings for this case, the
Government argued that it could detain Doe legally because the military
determined that he: was an enemy combatant; had supported or was a
member of ISIS; and had traveled voluntarily to Syria to participate in the
conflict.9 Before the settlement, the United States attempted to transfer Doe
out of Iraq. It is presumed that this attempted move was to Saudi Arabia
where Doe is also a citizen.10 Like his identity, any identification of the
countries that could receive him remains under sealed court records.11
Doe contended, however, that he was a reporter who traveled to Syria to
cover the conflict and that ISIS members forced him to support them.12 In
habeas filings, Doe argued that his detention was illegal because he was not
an enemy combatant and that citizen detention requires express
authorization from Congress. 13 Doe then asked to be released, charged, or
brought to the United States for trial.14
2018, 11:15 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/detention/us-citizen-detainedwithout-charge-trump-administration-year; see also Savage, Callimachi & Schmitt, supra
note 2.
9. Respondent’s Factual Return at 3, Doe v. Mattis, No. 1:17-cv-02069 (TSC) (D.D.C.
Feb. 14, 2018). For a concise description of Doe’s travel history including to Turkey and
Syria and his experience with ISIS, see Deb Riechman, US Citizen Held 13 Months for
Suspected Ties to ISIS Is Freed, MIL. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.
com/flashpoints/2018/10/29/us-citizen-held-13-months-for-suspected-ties-to-isis-is-freed/.
10. Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt & Adam Goldman, Officials Weigh Sending American
Detainee to Saudi Arabia, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/
20/us/politics/american-detainee-saudi-arabia.html.
11. ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 54 (D.D.C. 2017) (stating that ”the
detainee remains unnamed”); see also Doe, 889 F.3d at 751 (explaining transfers are
suggested for two countries).
12. Mattathias Schwartz, The Case Against John Doe, American Jihadist, NEW
REPUBLIC (Apr. 19, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/147806/case-john-doe-americanjihadist.
13. Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return at 2, Doe v. Mattis, No. 1:17cv-02069 (TSC) (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2018) (arguing the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
requires “express and deliberative legislative action”); id. at 3 (arguing detention is not
authorized since ISIS is not covered by the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224); id. at 4 (arguing ISIS detention is not covered by
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107243, 116 Stat. 1498).
14. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, ACLU Found. v. Mattis, No. 17-cv-02069
(D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017); Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Response
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Developments in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in this case raised significant
constitutional-law issues.15 These developments regard habeas remedies
and judicial power in national security and foreign relations, executive
detention during a conflict, and Congress’s legal authorization for war.
These are traditional legal issues for detention, which have been seen in the
War on Terror and in prior wars.16 But Doe v. Mattis is far different from
other cases. As described below, it serves to shape the role courts and the
Constitution play in the ISIS conflict, which continues over seventeen years
after Congress authorized a military response to the September 11, 2001,
attacks.
Three circumstances from Doe v. Mattis questioned American law’s
assumptions on military detention. First, because Doe is an American
citizen, he is entitled to heightened legal protections. Most habeas litigation
in the War on Terror has focused on alien detainees.17 With foreign
nationals, courts more readily defer to decisions of Congress or the
Executive Branch.18 Second, Congress has not expressly authorized a
military campaign against ISIS.19 Previously, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the
to Factual Return at 1, Doe v. Mattis, No. 1:17-cv-02069 (TSC) (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2018);
Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Response to Factual Return, Doe v. Mattis, No. 1:17cv-02069 (TSC) (D.D.C Feb. 28, 2018).
15. For good descriptions of the relevant doctrine and potential impacts of this case, see
Stephen I. Vladeck, Testing the Legal Limits of the War on Terrorism: The Case of an
American Held in Iraq, FOREIGN AFF.: SNAPSHOT (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.foreign
affairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-02-12/testing-legal-limits-war-terrorism;
Patricia
Stottlemyer, Doe v. Mattis: Is the War on ISIS Legal?, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/52896/doe-v-mattis-war-isis-legal/.
16. For examples of past and recent legal analysis on Guantánamo detention, see
BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, BROOKINGS INST., THE EMERGING
LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2010), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf;
BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & LARKIN REYNOLDS, THE EMERGING LAW OF
DETENTION 2.0: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING (2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Chesney-Full-Text-Update\32913.
pdf; Aziz Z. Huq, The President and the Detainees, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (2017).
17. See cf. Ernesto Hernández-López, Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration Law:
An Extraterritorial Constitution in a Plenary Power World, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 193, 21025 (2012) (explaining that, after initial habeas victories for detainees, immigration law has
been used to justify keeping many detainees on the base) [hereinafter Hernández-López,
Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration Law].
18. See generally id.
19. For a description of the legislative and legal complexities of AUMFs and ISIS, see
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Supreme Court determined that when Congress authorizes a military
conflict, it approves military detention for the duration of the conflict.20
Congress issued Authorizations for Use of Military Force (“AUMFs”) in
2001 against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their supporters in response to the
September 11 attacks and in 2002 to end Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq.21 It
is still debated whether ISIS, and thereby military detention for its members
and supporters, is covered by these AUMFs.22 Doe was detained as part of a
military campaign that is not expressly authorized by Congress in terms of
location—Syria—or in terms of its enemy—ISIS. The third complication
involves time, both because of the length of Doe’s detention and because
Congress’s last approval for military conflicts occurred over a decade ago.
The longer Doe was detained, the harder it was to justify deference to the
Executive Branch’s military authority. Similarly, deference to
congressional authorization became problematic because the conflict
deviated from the circumstances Congress contemplated in 2001 and 2002.
Claims of military urgency seem unrealistic, and wartime appears to be
indefinite. Thus, these three circumstances created significant doctrinal
questions about military conflict and habeas powers. Citizenship, doubts
about congressional authorization, and time all confounded any application
of War on Terror precedents to Doe v. Mattis.
Ryan Goodman, The Perils of a Congressional Authorization to Fight ISIS, JUST SECURITY
(Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/40346/perils-congressional-authorizationfight-isis/.
20. 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion). Only three other justices joined Justice
O’Connor’s opinion, but it is treated as controlling for the authority to detain since Justice
Thomas agreed that the Executive Branch had detention authority. See id. at 579 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (finding broad sources for the authority to detain).
21. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001);
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107243, 116 Stat. 1498.
22. There has been much scholarly discussion and some legislative efforts to have a new
congressional authorization for force against ISIS. See generally MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43760, A NEW AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST
THE ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND CURRENT PROPOSALS (2017) (describing recent proposals,
efforts under President Obama, and arguments for why ISIS fits within existing force
authorization); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Obama’s AUMF Legacy, 110 AM. J.
INT’L L. 628, 636–38 (2016) (detailing why the AUMF-authorized war has not ended and
how it has been interpreted to fight ISIS); Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the “War
on Terrorism”: Normalizing the Exceptional After 9/11, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31
(2012) (arguing a military approach to fighting terrorism, in terms of detention and
prosecution, has normalized “emergency-type” powers).
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This Article argues that there are three lessons from the habeas battle in
Doe v. Mattis concerning who can be detained militarily and how, where
they may be detained, and when detention occurs.23 The lessons regard
undefined terrain for habeas, overseas habeas for American citizens, and the
post-colonial aspects of military detention. After presenting its approach,
the Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents how Guantánamo habeas
jurisprudence resulted in some doctrinal clarity regarding overseas habeas,
while it also left significant legal issues unanswered. American political
realities added to these ambivalences and effectively continue base
detentions to the present day. These realities include refusal to bring
detainees to the United States, diplomatic challenges in transferring them to
their home countries or third countries, and ongoing conflicts against AlQaeda and the Taliban. Part II examines how Doe v. Mattis posed questions
about ISIS and who, how, when, and where to detain. This picks up where
habeas and Guantánamo policy left off. Doe v. Mattis asked if citizens can
be detained, if they can be transferred without notice, if Congress
previously authorized the conflict, and if ISIS is an enemy per prior
AUMFs. Part III identifies the doctrinal clarity that Doe v. Mattis provides
for habeas and overseas military detention. This section charts who, where,
and when to detain captives. Star Wars’s allegory describes these
developments, either as “The Force Awakens,” stressing transparency for
detainee treatment and influence by multiple government branches, or as
“The Phantom Menace,” with long-term detention, minimal information,
and executive deference.
The first habeas lesson is that Doe’s citizenship and the conflict’s
circumstances forced a habeas court into undefined legal terrain. Courts had
to examine if the Executive Branch could detain Doe legally. A lack of
political authorization for the ISIS conflict created the issue. An AUMF
specific to Syria or expressly including ISIS as an enemy would have made
it easier for courts to review the legality of detention in the ISIS conflict.24
23. The focus here is on the role of habeas in reviewing overseas military detention, to
begin charting how courts will influence detention policy as the War on Terror moves away
from Al Qaeda and the Taliban and from prior conflicts. This lens is historic, current, and
looks to the future. This Article does not examine relevant legal issues involving: the
settlement terms of Doe’s release, likely involving any rights to have a passport; law’s role
in shaping ISIS detentions by other states; Executive Branch reliance on the 2001 AUMF or
2001 AUMF for other military efforts; and habeas developments and congressional
measures that impact current Guantánamo detentions.
24. See supra note 22.
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Otherwise, who was subject to detention and how, where, and when
detention takes place remained less certain. Doe v. Mattis illustrates the
cloudy path courts face when reviewing military detention overseas and
when congressional authorization is unclear. Doe was released in October
of 2018, with no district court proceeding or ruling regarding whether the
Executive Branch had the authority to detain him.25 A series of pleadings
for these issues was submitted. The briefs addressed citizen detention, the
Non Detention Act (NDA), two AUMFs and ISIS, Congress’s authorization
of the ISIS conflict, and the Executive Branch’s inherent authority.26
Following Doe’s release, the Government stopped pursuing these
arguments, and the district court did not have to rule on these issues,
leaving much of the cloudy path still unclear.27
Second, the dispute confronted habeas anomalies raised by Guantánamo
detainees since 2002. The questions were as follows: if habeas powers
include court orders to stop detainee transfers,28 does detention become
indefinite and illegal when a conflict lacks any envisioned end,29 and is
citizen detention legal without any charge or opportunity to contest
custody?30 These issues for ongoing Guantánamo detentions remain
25. See ACLU Press Release, supra note 3; Jonathan Hafetz, U.S. Citizen, Detained
Without Charge by Trump Administration for a Year, Is Finally Free, ACLU BLOG: SPEAK
FREELY, https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/detention/us-citizen-detained-withoutcharge-trump-administration-year (Oct. 29, 2018, 11:15 AM); see also Savage, Callimachi
& Schmitt, supra note 2.
26. See infra Section II.C.
27. See cf. Robert Chesney, Doe v. Mattis Ends with a Transfer and a Cancelled
Passport:
Lessons
Learned,
LAWFARE
(Oct.
29,
2018,
11:14
AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/doe-v-mattis-ends-transfer-and-cancelled-passport-lessonslearned(describing how the case left significant legal issues unanswered, including if the
AUMFs cover ISIS).
28. See Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
559 U.S. 1005 (2010) (mem.); see also Khadr v. Obama, 563 U.S. 1016 (2011); Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at 12, Mohammed v. Obama, 561 U.S. 1042 (2010) (mem.) (No. 10A52); Hernández-López, Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration Law, supra note 17, at
225.
29. See generally Jonathan Hafetz, Detention Without End?: Reexamining the Indefinite
Confinement of Terrorism Suspects Through the Lens of Criminal Sentencing, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 326 (2014) (examining the legal problems with indefinite detention on the base). For a
recent denial of habeas for a Guantánamo detainee arguing the conflict from fifteen years
ago ended, see Al-Alwi v. Trump, 901 F.3d 294 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
30. For examples of issues raised by citizen detention in the War on Terror not in
overseas facilities, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004). For a description of how the Executive Branch does not have inherent
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unclear, and prior jurisprudence is inconclusive at best. In a statement
agreeing with certiorari denial in 2014, Justice Breyer explained that it is
uncertain if detention is authorized for persons “not engaged in an armed
conflict against the United States” and if the 2001 AUMF or the
Constitution “limits the duration of [base] detention.”31 For Justice Breyer,
these doubts exist despite the “limited category” of AUMF detention
approved in Hamdi.32
These legal questions from Guantánamo reappeared in Iraq during the
fight against ISIS. On its face, Doe v. Mattis focused on questions about
executive detention of an alleged combatant, but these issues are part of a
larger and far less clear context. For Doe, there was no ruling on whether
the Executive Branch had the authority to detain him, even after habeas
jurisdiction was affirmed in December of 2017.33 Doe remained in custody
for ten more months. In May of 2018, an appellate court asked the district
court to determine if Congress authorized this executive detention for an
ISIS combatant and if Doe was an enemy combatant.34 The district court
never made these findings.35 In July, Doe and the Government began
settlement negotiations. He was released in October. These rulings and
corresponding filings all focus on executive-detention authority. The
complication is that this authority is not precisely delineated with new
military conflicts, detentions occurring overseas, and doubts about
congressional authorization. These complexities explain why Doe was
detained for over a year and points to critical ambiguities in how courts,
Congress, and the Executive Branch shape detention policy. Even with
Doe’s release, executive custody for a year confirms that legal anomalies
persisted. These ambiguities will inform future military detention policy.
Third, Doe’s detention illustrates the moral and legal questions created
when American authority extends outside domestic borders. This
extraterritorial context reflects a recurring pattern in American history.
Over a decade ago, the habeas inquiry surrounding Guantánamo examined
American sovereignty and if the Constitution’s Suspension Clause and
authority to detain citizens why and this detention requires congressional support, see
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (2004).
31. Hussain v. Obama, 572 U.S. 1079 (2014) (mem.).
32. Id.
33. See ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2017).
34. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 763-64 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
35. For description of this and other events in a timeline, see ACLU Press Release,
supra note 3.
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habeas corpus rights applied overseas.36 For Guantánamo detainees, courts
looked to historic examples of American authority over Puerto Rico and in
wartime Germany, England, and Japan.37 Doe v. Mattis sparked an
additional set of questions regarding citizen detention, constitutional war
powers, and judicial checks on detainee transfers and releases.
Habeas recourse, when applied to the ISIS conflict, like Guantánamo a
decade ago, points to a post-colonial legal predicament. Post-colonialism is
a scholarly perspective examining how international forms of influence
remain after formal control by an imperial state ends.38 It identifies how
former colonies are subject to international influence, despite formal
independence or decolonization.39 Law exerts a post-colonial influence with
legal ordering in treaties, international borders, constitutions, and
sovereignty demarcations.40
In historic terms, Guantánamo exemplifies a post-colonial legacy. The
military base reflects an anomaly-by-design with the United States evading
sovereign authority there. It is a vestige of American empire over Cuba,
beginning with the Spanish-American War in 1898 and formally ceasing
with a U.S.-Cuba treaty in 1934.41 Per this international agreement, the
36. See Ernesto Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba: Does
the "Empire Strike Back"?, 62 SMU L. REV. 117, 188-95 (2009) [hereinafter HernándezLópez, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba].
37. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756–60 (2008); id. at 839 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the Insular Cases and Puerto Rico); id. at 762 (citing Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (regarding detention in Germany)); id. at 758-61 (citing
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (regarding disputes in
Japan and England)).
38. BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., POST-COLONIAL STUDIES: THE KEY CONCEPTS 186 (2000);
Geeta Chowdhry & Sheila Nair, Introduction: Power in a Postcolonial World, in POWER,
POSTCOLONIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: READING RACE, GENDER AND CLASS 1,
11 (Geeta Chowdhry & Sheila Nair eds., 2002).
39. Post-colonialism argues that prior events frame how present circumstances develop
and they frame what options presently exist to confront current predicaments. See generally
DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND
HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2000); Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept
of Governance in Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887, 891–92 (2000).
40. See generally Peter Fitzpatrick & Eve Darian-Smith, Laws of the Postcolonial: An
Insistent Introduction, in LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 1 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter
Fitzpatrick eds., 1999).
41. The United States has occupied Guantánamo since 1898, pursuant to a series of
treaties and international agreements. In the Treaty of Paris, Spain relinquished all sovereign
claims over Cuba. See Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the
Kingdom of Spain, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755-56. In 1903, Cuba agreed
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United States occupies Guantánamo without sovereignty over the base and
will continue to do so indefinitely.42 This lack of sovereignty fueled legal
assumptions that the U.S. Constitution had no force on the base.43 It
motivated detentions for Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers from 1991 to
1995,44 and has shaped War on Terror detention policy since 2002.45
Questions about American jurisdiction outside domestic borders have
framed how courts determine if, where, and how habeas applies to military
detentions.
Prior imperial arrangements shaped the contours of these doctrinal
inquiries. Military detentions depend on legal mechanisms that have been
devised since 1898 to ensure American control over Cuba. This process
continues to this day. For Guantánamo detainees, law’s post-colonial
impact concerns territorial occupation, sovereignty demarcations, and
international agreements.
to lease the base to the United States. See Agreement Between the United States and Cuba
for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, Feb. 16–23, 1903,
T.S. No. 418. With a 1934 treaty, the United States relinquished formal control over Cuba,
including a claimed right of military intervention, but its base occupation was effectively
made indefinite. See Treaty Between the United States of America and Cuba Defining Their
Relations, U.S.-Cuba, May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1682. For descriptions of how international
legal reasoning adapted from 1898 to the present day to secure American base control
without international sovereignty, see Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and
Guantánamo, Cuba, supra note 36, at 132 n.68. See also Joseph Lazar, International Legal
Status of Guantánamo Bay, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 730, 730-40 (1968).
42. See Ryan Faith, Here's Why the US Is Still Using Guantanamo to Squat in Cuba,
VICE NEWS (Mar. 24, 2016), https://news.vice.com/article/heres-why-the-us-is-still-usingguantanamo-to-squat-in-cuba; Liz Ševčenko, Guantánamo Bay's Other Anniversary: 110
Years of a Legal Black Hole, GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2012, 8:30 AM EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/28/guantanamo-bay-usa.
43. See Ševčenko, supra note 42.
44. See e.g., Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant
Attorneys Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II,
Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 32, 34–35
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). Asylum seeker detention on the base
resulted in a series of lawsuits, see Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 158–59
(1993), Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11th Cir. 1995), CubanAm. Bar. Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1430 (11th Cir. 1995); Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1326–29 n.19 (2nd Cir. 1992), Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v.
Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y 1993) (vacated by order to a settlement agreement).
45. See generally Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba,
supra note 36.
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The legal school of Third World Approaches to International Law
(“TWAIL”) takes insights from post-colonialism to examine international
law in terms of the doctrine’s historical development and proposals for its
change in the future.46 Accordingly, TWAIL authors have analyzed the War
on Terror, including James Gathii,47 Antony Anghie,48 and Usha
Natarajan.49 My writings examine how Guantánamo represents the law of
the informal American empire and how this concept adapts for wartime
detention,50 to detain aliens indefinitely,51 and to exert global influence for
the United States.52 TWAIL examinations of the War on Terror continue as
military campaigns likely enter their second decade.53
Specific to detaining ISIS, this Article’s TWAIL approach is twofold. It
identifies how the United States uses prior legal determinations to support
overseas power, and it draws from analogies in the Star Wars movie saga.
The former identifies how occupation of a Cuba base after 1898, military
detentions at the base since 2002, and Doe’s detention in Iraq reflect similar
legal questions. They concern executive authority and the Constitution’s
overseas reach or lack thereof. References to Star Wars movie themes help
illustrate abstract concepts like empire and unchecked executive power.

46. For descriptions of TWAIL, see Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, Beyond the
(Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of International Law, 45 L. & POL. AFR., ASIA
& LATIN AM. 195, 195 (2012); James Thuo Gathii, TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its
Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26, 26 (2011);
Makau Mutua & Antony Anghie, What Is TWAIL?, AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC., Apr. 2000, at
31, 31-32.
47. See James Thuo Gathii, Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and International
Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 335, 335 (2003).
48. See Antony Anghie, The War on Terror and Iraq in Historical Perspective, 43
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 45, 45-46 (2005).
49. See Usha Natarajan, Creating and Recreating Iraq: Legacies of the Mandate System
in Contemporary Understandings of Third World Sovereignty, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 799,
799-801 (2011).
50. See Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba, supra note 36,
at 121-22.
51. See Hernández-López, Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration Law, supra note
17, at 210-11.
52. See Ernesto Hernández-López, Guantánamo as a “Legal Black Hole”: A Base for
Expanding Space, Markets, and Culture, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 141, 149-50 (2010).
53. See generally James T. Gathii & Henry J. Richardson III, Introduction to
Symposium on TWAIL Perspectives on ICL, IHL, and Intervention, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 252
(2016) (describing TWAIL approaches to military force and essays by Asad Kiyani, Parvathi
Menon, Ntina Tzouvala, and Corri Zoli).
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In 2009, I described the post-colonial aspects of the Supreme Court
finding that habeas jurisdiction extends to alien detainees on Guantánamo.54
Boumediene v. Bush reflected the “Empire Strikes Back,” directing habeas
courts’s focus on functional control over territory overseas.55 The phrase
“Empire Strikes Back” refers to a Star Wars movie. The legacy of
American empire set a course for deciding if the Constitution has
extraterritorial application in the present day.56 The Supreme Court rejected
a finding that a lack of American sovereignty over Guantánamo justifies
excluding detainees from habeas privileges. The Court instead used a
functional approach to determine if habeas applies overseas.57 In later
proceedings for hundreds of detainees, lower courts interpreted habeas as a
flexible means to support extraterritorial authority.58 Detainees secured this
privilege and a decade later, they still use habeas to challenge detention.59
However, a minimal number of detainees actually have secured a court
order for their release from the base.60 The Supreme Court has agreed with
54. See generally Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba,
supra note 36.
55. See id. at 182. “Empire Strikes Back” is a reference to both a movie and the postcolonial perspective of looking at empire. See, e.g., BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., THE EMPIRE
WRITES BACK: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN POST-COLONIAL LITERATURES (1989) (taking its
title from Salman Rushdie, The Empire Writes Back with a Vengeance, TIMES (London), Jul.
3, 1982, at 8); STAR WARS EPISODE V: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (20th Century Fox &
Lucasfilm, 1980).
56. Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba, supra note 36, at
121-22.
57. Id. at 182.
58. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 813 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (presenting habeas as a
“flexible” device). For a description of the evolution of habeas as flexible, since
Boumediene and recently, see Shawn E. Fields, From Guantánamo To Syria: The
Extraterritorial Constitution In The Age Of “Extreme Vetting,” 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1123,
1158, 1174 (2018).
59. For a brief description of the current legal status of the forty-one detainees, see
Editorial Board, Donald Trump vs. Guantánamo’s Forever Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/opinion/trump-guantanamo-prisoners.html
[hereinafter N.Y. Times Editorial]. Eleven detainees filed a habeas petition contesting
detention conditions and a failure to be released and arguing current detention does not fall
within the AUMF. Motion for Order Granting Writ of Habeas Corpus, Al Bihani v. Trump at
2, No. 1:09-cv-00745-RCL (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2018).
60. A district court order to release the Uighur detainees in 2008 was not enforced. See
Hernández-López, Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration Law, supra note 17, at 212.
Two years after Boumediene was decided, the D.C. Circuit developed habeas reasoning that
critics claim denies detainees meaningful review. See generally Mark Denbeaux et al., No
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lower-court reasoning that courts cannot order base detainees to be released
from Guantánamo, even when habeas courts have found that their detention
was unlawful.61 Then, the constitutional inquiry is whether judicial power
extends to overseas territory, i.e., a base under uncontested American
control.
Doe v. Mattis reflects later post-colonial inquiries about ISIS regarding
detainees and the type of conflict. In this habeas episode, courts no longer
focus on territory under American control. For Doe, a habeas petition raised
questions about detainee status and Congress’s conflict authorization.
Specifically, this challenge asked whether a citizen can be detained as part
of a military conflict if Congress authorized the conflict over a decade and a
half ago with prior AUMFs and if ISIS can be classified as an enemy
pursuant to these AUMFs. Over a decade ago, ISIS did not exist, and there
was no civil war in Syria. On its doctrinal face, the dispute asked if the
United States could detain Doe without charge for conflict duration and if
courts must defer to military choices to transfer or release Doe. Seen as
creating national-security and separation-of-powers issues, Doe v. Mattis
posed fundamental questions about deference, citizen detention, and
Congress’s war powers.
The challenges posed by detainees in the ISIS conflict are much larger
than Doe. Already, these detentions pose complex legal problems for the
United Kingdom, Australia, Iraq, and Kurdish authorities, with detainee
citizenships revoked, fast trials in Iraq, and strains on Kurdish resources.62
Hearing Habeas: D.C. Circuit Restricts Meaningful Review (Seton Hall Pub. Law Research
Paper No. 2145554, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2145554.
For a basic description of detainee transfers numbers during Bush and Obama
administrations, see John Bellinger, Guantanamo Redux: Why It Was Opened and Why It
Should Be Closed (and Not Enlarged), LAWFARE (Mar. 12, 2017, 5:12 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/
guantanamo-redux-why-it-was-opened-and-why-it-should-be-closed-and-not-enlarged.
61. See cf. Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 551, 585-606 (describing how appellate court precedent and legislation nullify
habeas for Guantánamo detainees).
62. Since ISIS began losing significant territory, a large number of detainees are in SDF
or Iraqi facilities. Keeping them, conducting legal proceedings, and returning foreign
fighters home pose significant legal problems. This is similar to early Guantánamo
detentions with legal processes and foreign state responsibility that remains undefined. The
ISIS detainee population is far larger, from over forty-five countries, and is more dispersed
than with Guantánamo detentions. See generally Qassim Abdul-Zahra & Susannah George,
Iraq Holding More than 19,000 Because of IS Militant Ties, AP NEWS (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.apnews.com/aeece6571de54f5dba3543d91deed381 (reporting over 19,000
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The longer these detainees remain in custody, the more difficult the legal
issues become, including allegations that the United States transfers foreign
detainees to Iraq63 and prevents children and women captives from leaving
custody.64 Moreover, reports indicate that Kurdish authorities will not
conduct any trials for detainees and they complain that very few home
countries accept detainees.65 The United States has recently called on allies
to take their citizens detained in Syria or Iraq from the ISIS conflict.66
Recently, Senators requested that ISIS detainees should be relocated from
Iraq and Syria to Guantánamo, which only has detainees from the Al Qaeda
and Taliban conflicts.67
detainees held and 3000 sentenced to death in Iraq); Jenna Consigli, Prosecuting the Islamic
State Fighters Left Behind, LAWFARE (Aug. 1, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/prosecuting-islamic-state-fighters-left-behind (describing reluctance for countries to
receive their national detainees and efforts by United Kingdom and Australia to revoke
detainee citizenship); Jonathan Horowitz, Kurdish-Held Detainees in Syria Are Not in a
“Legal Gray Area,” JUST SECURITY (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/54866/
kurdish-held-detainees-syria-legal-gray-area/ (arguing detentions are part of a noninternational armed conflict and subject to international humanitarian law); Gordon Lubold,
U.S. Weighs Destinations for Islamic State Detainees in Syria, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2018,
5:58 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-weighs-destinations-for-islamic-statedetainees-in-syria-1531951090 (describing American support for SDF detention operations
without guarding and monitoring detentions); Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Wades Deeper Into
Detainee Operations in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/05/world/middleeast/pentagon-detainees-syria-islamic-state.html (stating detentions
are in a “legal gray area”).
63. See Human Rights Watch, US: Detainees Transferred from Syria to Iraq, (Oct. 31,
2018, 12:00 AM EDT), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/31/us-detainees-transferredsyria-iraq.
64. See Anne Speckhard & Ardian Shajkovci, PERSPECTIVE: In Legal Wrangling over
ISIS Families, Should Anyone Be Allowed Home?, GTSC: HOMELAND SECURITY TODAY.US
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/terrorism-study/perspective-inlegal-wrangling-over-isis-babies-parents-should-anyone-be-allowed-to-return-home/.
65. See Agence France-Press, The 'Heavy Burden' of ISIS Detainees in Kurdish Jails,
ARAB WEEKLY (Oct. 23, 2018), https://thearabweekly.com/heavy-burden-isis-detaineeskurdish-jails.
66. Press Release, Robert Palladino, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Terrorist
Fighters in Syria (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2019/02/288735.htm; see
also Sarah el Deeb & Matthew Lee, U.S. Calls for Repatriation of Foreign Fighters Held in
Syria, AP NEWS (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/377a62fbd303407e8b7ad9
cfc59d62fe.
67. Carol Rosenburg, U.S.: Guantánamo Still an Option for ISIS Captives in Syria Who
Can’t Go Home, MCCLATCHY: DC BUREAU (Feb. 6, 2019, 6:37 PM),
https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-
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But looking beyond questions about executive power—i.e., “if detention
is legal” or “if a court must defer”—Doe v. Mattis faced undetermined
aspects about overseas American power. In this Article, I describe this as a
debate about the uncertainty regarding how military detention is checked. It
is clear is that the United States will continue with military conflicts against
ISIS, in Syria, Iraq, and in locations across the globe.68 Tropes from the Star
Wars movies help explain this debate. They are the Phantom Menace and
the Force Awakens.
In the Star Wars saga, the Phantom Menace refers to the creeping and
hidden political forces that change a republic into an empire.69 For our
present story—that of habeas extended to a hemisphere far, far away—the
Phantom Menace refers to the lack of clarity regarding whether courts
review or take a hands-off approach to overseas military detention. In
doctrinal terms, “The Phantom Menace” represents the debate regarding
whether rights protections or deference applies to military detention of a
citizen in the ISIS conflict in Iraq. Also from the Star Wars saga, “The
Force Awakens” refers to the military effort to destroy the First Order,
which re-imposes imperial order and ends a Republic.70 For the recent
habeas story, “The Force Awakens” operates as a symbol of transparent
detention policies, checks on executive power, and judicial or congressional
oversight of detention operations.

security/guantanamo/article225544185.html.
68. For descriptions of how the conflict could expand to its many affiliates beyond Iraq
and Syria, see Daniel Byman, ISIS Goes Global: Fight the Islamic State by Targeting Its
Affiliates, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2016, at 76; Lisa Monaco, Opinion, The Next Front in
the U.S. Fight Against ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/11/opinion/the-next-front-in-the-us-fight-against-isis.html. For analysis of how the
ISIS conflict changes after it loses its territorial control in Iraq and Syria, see Jason Burke,
Rise and Fall of ISIS: Its Dream of a Caliphate Is Over, so What Now?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/21/isis-caliphate-islamic-state-raqqairaq-islamist; Zachary Laub, What to Watch For in Post-ISIS and Syria, COUNCIL FOREIGN
REL.: BACKGROUNDER (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-watch-postisis-iraq-and-syria. For years, the United States fight against ISIS has been slower than prior
conflicts because it has sought to empower local forces and takes place in many locations
outside ISIS territory. See Kevin Baron & Defense One, How the U.S. Military Sees the
Anti-ISIS fight: A Dispatch from Iraq, ATLANTIC (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.
com/international/archive/2017/01/obama-doctrine-military-trump/513470/.
69. STAR WARS EPISODE I: THE PHANTOM MENACE (20th Century Fox & Lucasfilm
1999).
70. STAR WARS EPISODE VII: THE FORCE AWAKENS (Lucasfilm 2015).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/5

2019]

DETAINING ISIS

1125

For the legal battles over habeas, the issues regarding the detained
subject are whether the conflict is legally authorized, and how non-state
actors are classified as enemies. These issues point to potential “phantoms”
or “force awakenings.” They framed Doe’s detention and eventual
disposition and reflected an evolution since the initial habeas battles on
Guantánamo. In those episodes, courts focused on alien detainees, the
Constitution’s exterritorial reach, and territorial control without
sovereignty. As explained below, extraterritorial doctrine adapted similarly
in the past, after base possession from 1898 to 1991, to civilian alien
detention from 1991 to 1995, and to military detention since 2002.
I. Habeas Reaches Detainees on a Secluded American Base (The Empire
Strikes Back71)
A long time ago (long before ISIS) in a hemisphere far, far away (from
Iraq or Syria), the seed for habeas’s phantom menace was planted near
Guantánamo, a city on the eastern end of Cuba. Since the late nineteenth
century, the United States has occupied territory for a military base at the
mouth of Guantánamo Bay.72 This U.S. Naval Station is usually called
Guantánamo or “GTMO.” American troops initially arrived there to fight
Spanish forces during the Spanish-American War of 1898.73 The United
States points to legal support from various international agreements to
remain there indefinitely, even though Cuba contests the agreements’
terms.74 The United States has used the base to monitor Cuba and the
Caribbean, launch military interventions in the region, support Allied forces
in World War II, and detain asylum seekers from Cuba and Haiti (199195).75

71. See supra note 55.
72. See generally Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba,
supra note 36.
73. See Today in History: June 10, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/item/today-inhistory/june-10 (last visited Aug. 24, 2018); M.E. Murphy, The History of Guantanamo Bay
1494-1964, U.S. NAVAL STATION: GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, http://web.archive.org/
web/20060710215035/http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/history/gtmohistorymurphyvol1ch2.htm
(last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (chapter 2, “How the Spanish lost Guantanamo Bay”).
74. See supra notes 41, 42.
75. See JANA K. LIPMAN, GUANTÁNAMO: A WORKING CLASS HISTORY BETWEEN EMPIRE
AND REVOLUTION 6 (2009); see Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo,
Cuba, supra note 36, at 128-29 n.51.
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The legal needs of the American empire created Guantánamo. A TWAIL
reading of sovereignty on the base shows how law has facilitated War on
Terror detention. Base functions have adapted from geopolitical and
strategic needs to detention because Guantánamo was crafted as an
anomalous zone. Gerald Neuman defines “anomalous zones” as geographic
locations where legal norms are suspended due to perceived political
need.76 War-on-Terror detainees were brought to Guantánamo in 2002.77
Then, norm suspension was evidenced by legal interpretations that specific
rights protections in American law do not have force on Guantánamo, even
if they would apply domestically in the United States. At that time, the
perceived political need was intelligence for the conflict against Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban.
These past episodes in legal anomaly chart a doctrinal and policy course
for how American citizen John Doe was detained without any charge in an
undisclosed facility in Iraq. Specifically, three Supreme Court cases on
Guantánamo between 2004 and 2008—Rasul v. Bush (2004),78 Hamdi v.
Bush (2004),79 and Boumediene v. Bush (2008)80—approved military
detention at an overseas American location with limited but important
judicial oversight. This Article refers to these as the “Guantánamo Cases”
to illustrate that issues left unresolved by them and their lower-court
progeny reappear a decade later in Doe v. Mattis. For earlier anomaly,
detention took place in Cuba during the conflict against Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, while current uncertainties exist regarding detention in Iraq with
respect to the ISIS conflict. The Guantánamo Cases set legal parameters for
who may be detained and under what circumstances. But a decade ago,
courts avoided significant legal determinations regarding detention of a
citizen overseas, restrictions on detainee transfers, and when detention
authority expires (if ever). Now, these legal ambivalences set a policy
course for ISIS detentions.

76. This is adapted from Gerald L. Neuman’s definition for “anomalous zones.” See
Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996).
77. Faith, supra note 42.
78. 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (finding base detainees have access to statutory habeas
corpus rights).
79. 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (holding the Executive Branch may detain persons
engaged in conflict for the conflict’s duration and setting the parameters for detention
authority used on and off the base).
80. 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (holding base detainees have access to habeas provided in
the Constitution’s Suspension clause).
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In doctrinal terms, the Guantánamo Cases focused on executive authority
applied to military detentions overseas. They used separation-of-powers
reasoning to check detention policies. Generally, the Supreme Court has
held that a constitutional form of government, made up of three different
branches, requires ruling against the Government’s position. The Bush
Administration claimed unilateral authority over detentions and argued for
deference from the courts.81 With these decisions, the judiciary exerted its
influence in shaping Guantánamo detention policies. This preserved a role
for courts when they were urged to defer to the political authority of the
President, given national-security emergencies and ongoing military
conflicts. In each case, significant dissenting opinions supported this
deference. Most decisions for the Court were reached only by a slim
majority. Yet, in three cases, the majority of the Court’s justices affirmed
that important limits apply to the President’s detention authority on the
base.
The Supreme Court reviewed the legal impacts of controversial
detentions early in the War on Terror. Decisions in Rasul,82 Hamdi,83 and
Boumediene84 were landmark judicial pronouncements on executive
authority pursued in the name of national security. The Court found that
detention policies were limited by acts of Congress, international and
domestic laws of war, and the Constitution. The foci were the federal
habeas statute in Rasul; Fifth Amendment Due Process rights, the laws of
war, and the Geneva Conventions in Hamdi; and the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause in Boumediene. These decisions applied legal norms that
previously were interpreted as suspended on the base. These decisions
shaped wartime detentions with rulings on habeas, detention in an ongoing
conflict, and constitutional habeas extended to alien detainees on an
overseas base, respectively. This Article section describes initial base
detentions, how they sparked the Guantánamo Cases, this doctrine’s role in
military detentions, and the resulting changes in the law to support overseas
authority. From a TWAIL perspective, it shows how the base changed from

81. For a brief description on how claims of unilateral authority fit within the War on
Terror legal strategy, see Warren Richey, Bush Pushed the Limits of Presidential Power,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 14, 2009), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2009/0114/
p11s01-usgn.html.
82. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485.
83. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539.
84. Boumeiene, 553 U.S. at 798.
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serving geopolitical necessities to detention functions to then providing
constitutional support for extraterritorial authority.
A. Captives Taken Clear Across the Globe to Cuba
Four months after the attacks of September 11, on January 11, 2002,
twenty men were brought from Afghanistan to Guantánamo.85 They were
the first War on Terror detainees taken to the base. The overseas military
campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban was in its third month. Quick
victories dislodged Taliban rule in Kabul and spurred Al-Qaeda members,
often foreigners, to flee from bases in Afghanistan. The United States and
its allies captured a significant number of men in Afghanistan or Pakistan.
Many were taken clear across the world to Guantánamo.86
Unlike a location in the United States with more accessible and existing
facilities, Guantánamo was perceived to be beyond the jurisdiction of
American courts. By the end of 2002, it had over 600 detainees, all brought
from across the globe.87 They were not charged with crimes or subject to
any proceedings, including those required by the Geneva Conventions.88
The Bush Administration claimed that the Executive Branch had sole
discretion to decide if detention was warranted. The detainee population
peaked at 680 men on May 9, 2003.89 Nearly 800 total have been detained
on Guantánamo.90
Detentions made this quiet and forgotten American outpost in the
Caribbean the subject of enormous legal controversies. Guantánamo has
been characterized as a “rights-free zone,” “law’s exception,” “anomalous
zone,” the “gulag of our time,” and a “legal black hole.”91 “Anomaly” does
85. Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantánamo Docket: A History of the Detainee
Population, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last visited Mar. 15,
2019).
86. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S TASK FORCE
ON DETAINEE TREATMENT 34 (2003), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/
files/constitution-project-report-on-detainee-treatment_0.pdf.
87. By December 2002, the base had 624 detainees, see the “Overview” and “History of
the Detainee Population” for December 2002, Scheinkman et al., supra note 85.
88. Id. at 36.
89. Id. at 38.
90. Scheinkman et al., supra note 85.
91. See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479, 1509
(2003); Nasser Hussain, Beyond Norm and Exception: Guantánamo, 33 CRITICAL INQUIRY
734 (2007); Neuman, supra note 76, at 1197, 1201; Amnesty International Report 2005:
Speech by Irene Khan at Foreign Press Association (May 26, 2005),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/88000/pol100142005en.pdf;
Henry
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not mean that Guantánamo is something unique or isolated. Instead,
“anomaly” refers to how extraterritorial authority on the base evades legal
obligations due to perceived political necessities. The notion of anomaly
focuses on this separation between legal norms and extraterritorial rule,
evident in the framework used to govern overseas. The concept of anomaly
allows for examining this separation, where it occurs, when it is used, to
whom it applies, and how it evolves.
Legal anomaly has been a permanent fixture of American presence on
the base. The United States secured overseas territorial occupation, with
Cuban sovereignty checked on the base. In 2002, Guantánamo appeared as
a “legal black hole,” but in reality, its legal ambiguities reflected historic
practices. Legal anomaly facilitates extraterritorial authority. Relying on
legal anomaly implicit in overseas presence, countries exert political
authority beyond their domestic borders. Historically, these ambivalences
provided control over territory. Lauren Benton illustrates how European
empires capitalized on legal anomalies to control land beyond their
domestic borders and to span across continents, colonize populations, and
exert military and commercial influence.92
Guantánamo represents a long-term, dedicated, and sizable American
presence overseas. The base covers nearly forty-five square miles on both
the leeward and windward sides of the bay entrance but does not fully
surround the bay.93 It is located on the island’s south coast and near its
eastern edge, close to the easiest entryway into the Gulf of Mexico from the
Atlantic Ocean between Cuba and Haiti. In November of 1991, the United
States detained Haitian refugees who were interdicted at sea while fleeing a
military coup.94 The number of refugee detainees quickly grew to 34,090
within six months.95 In 1994, Cuban refugees were detained at the base.
Their number eventually grew to 33,000.96 Before the War on Terror, most
Weinstein, Prisoners May Face ‘Legal Black Hole,’ L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at A1; Johan
Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole (Twenty-Seventh F.A. Mann Lecture, Nov.
25, 2003), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/guantanamo.pdf.
92. LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN
EMPIRES, 1400-1900, at 8 (2010).
93. Carol Rosenberg, Guantánamo: By the Numbers, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 25, 2018,
11:26 AM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/guantanamo/
article2163210.html.
94. JONATHAN M. HANSEN, GUANTÁNAMO: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 284 (2011).
95. Id. at 292.
96. Christina M. Frohock, “Brisas Del Mar”: Judicial and Political Outcomes of the
Cuban Rafter Crisis in Guantánamo, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39, 45 (2012) (citing U.S.
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Americans were unaware that the United States had a base in Cuba. Even
fewer knew that the United States occupies it indefinitely, over Cuba’s
protest for more than half a century.
Guantánamo’s current legal ambiguities are a product of its past. History
demonstrates that it is not an aberration that the military operates in a
location lacking defined limits for American authority. Guantánamo is not a
“quirky outpost” with a “unique and unusual” jurisdiction, as Supreme
Court opinions state.97 Instead, legal ambiguities have been vital to base
functions for a century. This anomaly-by-design has supported American
objectives overseas, setting the stage for refugee and War on Terror
detainees.
B. Enemy Combatants, Laws of War, and Habeas (Who, When, and How to
Detain)
Two and a half years after Guantánamo detentions began, on June 28,
2004, the Supreme Court found that courts could review the legality of
detentions and that, because of Congress’s use-of-force authorization, the
laws of war applied to base detentions. The Court issued its first two
detention decisions: Rasul, regarding base detainee access to courts, and
Hamdi, focusing on executive detention authority. Both affirmed that courts
can review detention policies and that courts can help formulate detention
procedures.98 Rasul provided an early statement on habeas court jurisdiction
at this extraterritorial location and on the relief sought by aliens detained
there.99 Hamdi determined what kind of detentions could be conducted,
who could be detained, under what process, and what limits were imposed
on the duration of detentions.100 Fifteen years later, these two issues—
extraterritorial habeas powers and the limits of executive detention—
framed the uncertainty regarding Doe.
In 2004, the base had approximately 640 detainees. They had not been
charged with any wrongdoing, allowed to talk to an attorney, or subject to

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NSAIAD 95-211, CUBA: U.S. RESPONSE TO THE 1994
CUBAN MIGRATION CRISIS 3, 9 (1995); United States Navy Fact File: Naval Station
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba (Nov. 8, 2011)).
97. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 826, 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
98. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470
(2004).
99. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470–73.
100. See generally Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
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any court or tribunal.101 These cases were the product of claims raised since
2002. A significant result of these legal disputes was that base detentions
came under greater public and political scrutiny. Before then, detainee
numbers and identities were unknown. After Rasul and Hamdi, the
Pentagon released these numbers and identities. This release was the result
of detainee habeas litigation, media reports, and Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests made by the Associated Press.102 On March 3, 2006,
the Pentagon first disclosed the names of the detainees.103
Focused on a role for courts, Rasul began carving judicial review of base
detentions in the form of habeas proceedings.104 Its holdings focused on
courts having the ability to review detentions at the base, with alien
detainees entitled to file habeas petitions for their release.105 The Supreme
Court held that the federal habeas corpus statute “confers on the District
Court jurisdiction to hear [detainees’] habeas corpus challenges to the
legality of their detention” on the base.106 This was permitted even though
the detainees were aliens in military custody.107
Rasul began to examine the location of detention and address the legal
uncertainty of Guantánamo’s status—outside American sovereignty but
within exclusive American control. The opinion of the Court initially noted
that the lease agreement with Cuba from February 1903 affirms that the
United States has “complete jurisdiction and control” over the base.108 The
habeas statute confers jurisdiction to persons detained “within ‘the
territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States.”109 These, read together, negate
the presumption in American law that statutes do not operate
extraterritorially. The lease and the statute both refer to jurisdiction, the
former at the base and the latter to persons. In oral argument, the
Government conceded that a federal court would have jurisdiction over
101. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471–72.
102. See Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 05-cv-03941-JSR (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
19, 2005); Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 05-cv-05468-JSR (S.D.N.Y. June 9,
2005); Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. 06-cv-01939-JSR (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13,
2006).
103. See Associated Press, U.S. Reveals Identities of Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2006.
104. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470.
105. See id. at 484-85.
106. Id. at 484.
107. Id. at 484–86.
108. Id. at 480.
109. Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
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claims raised by American citizens at the base.110 The Rasul court
emphasized control and occupation of the base as motivations for checking
executive detention authority.111
With prudential reasoning, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
suggested how American base occupation is subject to significant legal
norms. It highlighted the long-term aspects of American presence, stating
that the base “is in every practical respect a United States territory.”112 This
reasoning runs contrary to claims that a lack of sovereignty, as indicated in
the 1903 base lease agreement, required denying habeas on the base. Justice
Kennedy noted that, in a formal sense, the United States lacks sovereignty,
but that this “is no ordinary lease” and “[w]hat matters is the unchallenged
and indefinite control.”113 The likelihood of indefinite detention on
Guantánamo without any trial or proceedings weakened the Executive
Branch’s need for deference. Deference was justified if these detentions
were closer, physically and temporally, to military hostilities.114
A dissenting opinion emphasizes formal versus prudential legal
reasoning. Justice Scalia argued that, because the United States lacked
sovereignty over Guantánamo, habeas cannot be extended to alien
detainees.115 This formal approach to determining habeas jurisdiction
emphasized sovereignty in order to find that courts cannot review
detentions. A functional or prudential perspective finds that there can be
court review, and it stresses the practical means the military has to
administer habeas.
The same day as Rasul, the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Hamdi, which focused on military detention authority. This case resulted in
two important holdings: one regarding executive detention authority and the
other regarding procedural rights for detainees.116 A plurality of the court
upheld the President’s authority for military detention in the conflict.117 It
explained that detention is legal for enemy combatants as authorized by
Congress in the AUMF from September 14, 2001. The Court nonetheless
110. Id. at 481 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004) (No. 03-334)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 488.
115. Id. at 488-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
117. Id. at 509.
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required that the detained should “be given a meaningful opportunity to
contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral
decisionmaker.”118 The opinion is presented as preventing one branch of
government from having too much power, even during military conflict,
and assuring these roles when individual liberties are at stake.119 The
plurality opinion—plus Justice Thomas’s dissent—held that the Executive
Branch had detention authority, while the plurality opinion was joined by
two justices to hold that detainees were entitled to due process and could
challenge their combatant classification.120 As such, five justices held that
the Executive Branch had detention authority, and six held that detainees
possessed procedural rights. Aside from this, the opinions were quite
fractured. These doctrinal fissures reappeared in Doe v. Mattis over a
decade later, regarding citizen detention overseas, the Non Detention Act,
whether the AUMF satisfies this Act, and laws of war as applied to
American citizens.121 Likewise, these multiple opinions raise broader issues
such as inherent executive authority to detain and the suspension of habeas.
The case involved Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen by birth,
who had been captured in Afghanistan and initially detained on
Guantánamo.122 Upon confirming that Hamdi was a citizen born in
Louisiana, the military transferred him to a naval brig off Norfolk, Virginia.
There, he was put into solitary confinement without access to an attorney.
The Government argued that this detention was legal because he was an
“enemy combatant.”123 It claimed that the Executive Branch alone could
classify who was an “enemy combatant” and that this classification did not
require any determination by a court or tribunal.124
In reference to the detention authority, Justice O’Connor’s plurality
opinion pronounced a series of significant limitations on the Executive
Branch’s discretion to detain. Four justices supported this opinion. First, the
opinion affirmed that combatants could be subject to military detentions. It
stated that “capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture,
detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by ‘universal agreement and

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
See id. at 536.
Id. at 525, 579.
See infra Section II.C.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509-11.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 516–17.
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practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of war.’”125 This power was “clearly
and unmistakably” authorized by Congress in the AUMF, passed in
response to September 11 attacks.126 Second, it provided a limited, but
working, classification of who could be detained. It left for future courts the
task of determining the full scope of the term “enemy combatants.”127 For
the time, it explained that those who could be detained included persons
“part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition
partners” in Afghanistan and who “engaged in an armed conflict [there]
against the United States.”128 Importantly, Hamdi was caught in
Afghanistan supporting the Taliban. The Hamdi decision did not specify if
detention was legal for those more removed from actual hostilities, the
battlefield, or enemy membership. Third, the Court reasoned that detention
was illegal if it was indefinite. Referring to multilateral treaties, including
the Third Geneva Convention, the Court explained that “it is a clearly
established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer
than active hostilities.”129 It added that the United States was “not
authorized” to conduct indefinite detention for interrogation.130 Fourth, it
clarified that detention of combatants with the aim of preventing a return to
battle was authorized so long as “United States troops are still involved in
active combat in Afghanistan.”131
These findings from the plurality opinion in Hamdi laid down important
restrictions on executive power by affirming the source of detention
authority, who may be detained, and how long they could be detained. The
Court confirmed that judicial oversight, laws of war, and international law
limited detention policies, despite the Government’s view. The Government
had argued that its authority to detain evaded judicial oversight and was
sourced in the President’s military authority and not in congressional
authorization.132
125. Id. at 518 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30, 63 (1942)).
126. Id. at 519.
127. Id. at 516.
128. Id. at 526. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined this
part. Id. at 509.
129. Id. at 520 (citing Article 20 of the Hague Convention (II) on Laws and Customs of
War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1817; Hague Convention (IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2301).
130. Id. at 521.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 516-17 (stating Government argues no congressional authorization is needed
to detain because “the Executive [Branch] possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to
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In reference to how detentions could be conducted, the plurality of the
Court rebuked the idea that “enemy combatants” had no rights to hearings
to challenge their status. Referring to the Fifth Amendment, the plurality
found that a due process balancing test applied. Under this test, the
detainee’s “elemental” interest in physical liberty would be weighed against
the Government’s “weighty and sensitive” interest in conducting war.133
The detainee’s interest includes notice of “the factual basis for his
classification” that mandates detention and a “fair opportunity to rebut the
Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”134 The
process also includes detainee access to counsel, procedures “tailored” to
meet the Executive Branch’s needs during “ongoing military conflict,”
admission of hearsay evidence, and a rebuttable “presumption in favor of
the Government’s evidence.”135 The opinion added that military tribunals
could meet these standards. This process is not required for those initially
captured on the battlefield, but “only when the determination is made to
continue to hold those who have been seized.”136 The opinion suggested
that there was a legal impact to detentions distanced from the site of
military conflict and emphasized that physical distance and the duration of
detention limit what deference courts would afford military detentions by
the Executive Branch.
Aside from the Court’s two central rulings, the divided opinions did not
agree on various factors. Justice Thomas’s dissent authorized detention
reaching a similar conclusion as the majority, to reach sufficient votes to
reach a plurality of the court.137 But, Thomas found a far broader source of
this power—the President’s unitary authority as Commander-in-Chief and
head of foreign relations.138 Justice Thomas argued that the AUMF
authorizes military conflict, which includes military detention.139 The
opinion noted that courts should defer to this executive authority and not

Article II of the Constitution”); id. at 510–11 (stating Government further argues that
“enemy combatant” status justifies indefinite detention without formal charges or
proceedings until the executive determines access to an attorney or further process is
warranted).
133. Id. at 529, 531.
134. Id. at 533.
135. Id. at 533-34.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 579-80.
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limit detention by the Geneva Conventions or by balancing procedural
challenges with compelling security interests.140
Justice Souter’s opinion concurred in judgment, while dissenting in part
and concurring in part.141 It observed many of the detention-authority
questions, raised by Doe’s habeas in 2018 and identified by the court of
appeals, as necessitating more fact-finding.142 Justice Souter noted that the
Non Detention Act prohibits detention for citizens without a clear statement
from Congress.143 The AUMF is not such a statement because it does not
mention detention but merely authorizes military conflict in response to the
September 11 attacks.144 Moreover, because Hamdi’s detention does not
comply with the Third Geneva Convention, it does not meet laws-of-war
requirements.145 In sum, Justice Souter argued that the Executive Branch
does not have this authority to detain enemy combatants, based on the
requirement for clear congressional statements, citizen rights, and
protections in international law.
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion also stressed the rights of citizens but
did so by noting the constitutional harms of indefinite detention.146 It
argued that the detainee should be charged or released and, if not, then
Congress was required to suspend habeas in order to keep Hamdi
detained.147 The opinion commented that detention that conforms to the
laws of war does not necessarily make detention of a citizen legal.148 The
opinion prioritizes the protections afforded to citizens, noting that laws of
war are not applicable to Americans.149 While Justice Souter emphasized
Congress’s detention authorization and international laws-of-war
protections, Justice Scalia noted that the Constitution does not authorize
indefinite detention or detention without charge and that a habeas
suspension is needed to continue such detention.

140. Id. at 579, 587.
141. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
142. See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
143. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment).
144. Id. at 547, 549-51.
145. Id. at 549, 553.
146. Id. at 554-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 554.
148. Id. at 564.
149. See id. at 554.
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C. The Constitution Extends Habeas Overseas to Alien Detainees (More
Answers for Where and How to Detain)
On June 10, 2008, in Boumediene, the Supreme Court issued its most
important decision on Guantánamo detentions, ruling that the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause extends to the base.150 By doing this, the Court made
major judicial pronouncements regarding the extraterritorial reach of the
Constitution and the rights afforded to alien detainees captured during
military conflict. The Court’s decision directly answered questions about
whether norms in constitutional law could continue to be suspended at
Guantánamo. For habeas privileges, the answer was “no.” Specifically,
Boumediene asked whether base detainees benefit from the writ of habeas,
which is guaranteed in the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.151 The Court
found that the writ of habeas did apply to the base.152
The Court acknowledged the novelty of its holding, with Guantánamo
outside American sovereignty and noncitizens entitled to constitutional
protections overseas.153 Circumstances at the base motivated this reasoning,
including detainees being held by Executive Branch Order during one of
“the longest wars in American history” on territory technically not part of,
but “under complete and total control” of the United States.154 The Court
found that extending habeas to the base did not pose an “impracticable or
anomalous” problem.155 It used this standard, regarding what could not be
achieved in practical terms, to determine when legal protections were
required overseas. The Court held that constitutional norms such as habeas
did extend to Guantánamo. It also found that deference to the political
branches is not justified by a lack of sovereignty on the base, executive
military-detention choices, or the alienage of detainees. The Boumediene
decision was seen as finally guaranteeing detainees their day in court to
challenge detention and to ask for release. For many observers, it confirmed
that the Constitution followed the American flag that flew over an
American base at Guantánamo.

150. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (referring to the Suspension
Clause in the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 2).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 732.
153. Id. at 770–71.
154. Id. at 771.
155. Id. at 769–70 (referring to the test in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan,
J., concurring in the result)).
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Boumediene’s reasoning focused on broader constitutional law themes.
The opinion of the Court essentially justified the rulings by arguing that
constitutional values were implicit in individual-right protections and that
each governmental branch, including the judiciary, has an influential role
when national security is threatened. The opinion explained that “[t]he laws
and Constitution are designed to . . . remain in force in extraordinary times”
and that “[l]iberty and security can be reconciled” with habeas corpus,
which is “a right of first importance.”156 The Court directly addressed the
suspension of the Constitution at Guantánamo. It stated that the
Constitution cannot be turned off at this location, by the President or
Congress, especially since detentions were in their sixth year. Boumediene
emphasized separation-of-power concepts to include Guantánamo within
the protections provided by American law, specifically in the form of the
Constitution’s habeas guarantees.157
The opinion noted that the Constitution “cannot be contracted away”158
on Guantánamo, referencing the Government’s argument that the
Constitution has no effect on noncitizens on the base. The Court argued that
the President and Congress have the power to “acquire, dispose of, and
govern territory” but not “to decide when and where [the Constitution’s]
terms apply.” The political branches cannot have the power “to switch the
Constitution on or off at will.” If they did, it would be a “striking anomaly”
in a government made up of three branches. It would mean that Congress
and the President, and not the Supreme Court, decide “what the law is.”
The Court’s reasoning for why habeas is required on the base focused on
how the suspension of habeas impacts the separation of power between the
judiciary, Congress, and the Executive Branch. Detentions, an overseas
base, and habeas challenges became questions about the different roles for
the branches of government. The Court did not view this extraterritorial
issue as a question about legal obligations required because of territory or
an individual’s alienage or citizenship. Instead, it saw habeas issues on the
base as a separation-of-power matter.159 This inquiry squarely asked about
the political justification for suspending a legal norm. The Government
argued that suspension was required because courts must defer to the
military detention authority, especially in extraterritorial matters. The
156. Id. at 798.
157. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941,
966–68 (2011).
158. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
159. Id. at 746.
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Court’s inquiry essentially asked why legal anomaly may continue. Legal
anomalies require the suspension of legal norms at a location due to
political need. Referring to separation of powers, the Court emphasized that
the application of a norm is required. In this case, it was habeas.
Separation-of-powers inquiry has specific implications for habeas
review. The Court in Boumediene stated that habeas is “an indispensable
mechanism for monitoring separation of powers.”160 Deciding when to
apply it should not be “subject to manipulation by those whose power it is
designed to restrain.”161 In other words, Congress and the President should
not determine when habeas applies to the base detentions because habeas is
meant to restrain their detention power. The Court noted that deference
should be afforded to the political branches so they can respond to nationalsecurity threats, such as by utilizing the power to detain in military
conflict.162 The Court explained the importance of habeas, describing the
“freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that
is secured by adherence to the separation of powers.”163 The power to
challenge detention by the Executive Branch is not “undermine[d],” but
“vindicated,” when confirmed by the judicial branch.164
The Court also prioritized pragmatic concerns to decide when
constitutional norms apply overseas. It focused on practical issues, asking
what kind of control the government exercises. Legal observers have called
this a “prudential,” “pragmatic,” and “functionalist approach.”165 The Court
contrasted a formalist interpretation, which focuses on how overseas
authority is defined and disregards how authority is actually exercised. A
formalist perspective, which the Government and dissenting opinions
argued for, would suggest that constitutional checks do not apply because

160. Id. at 765.
161. Id. at 766.
162. Id. at 796-97.
163. Id. at 797.
164. Id.
165. See Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1, 65 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); (describing Boumediene as a
functional versus formalistic test); Kiyemba v Obama, 561 F.3d 524 (emphasizing prudential
concerns and referring to Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2267); Hernandez Lopez, Boumediene
v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba, supra 36 at 175; Saurav Ghosh, Boumediene Applied
Badly: The Extraterritorial Constitution After Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 64 STAN. L. REV. 510
(2012); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82
S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 287 (2009).
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Guantánamo is not within American sovereignty.166 Cuba has sovereignty,
and the United States is leasing the territory without sovereign authority.
This formalist perspective thus emphasizes that these legal checks would
interfere with Cuban sovereignty.167
Focusing on control versus formal sovereignty became highly significant
for Boumediene. Examining practical control, the Court was able to relate
American authority over the base with concerns relevant to extending
habeas. The Court explained that the United States has exercised “plenary
control” over base territory since 1898168 without any foreseeable change or
limitation, and Cuba exercises no influence over the territory.169 Under the
February 1903 lease agreement, “the United States is, for all practical
purpose, answerable to no other sovereign for its acts on the base.”170 The
Court emphasized how practical concerns determined when habeas did or
did not apply overseas.171 These concerns include the desire to avoid
conflicting judgments by courts and the practical inability to enforce a
judgment because of distance.172 At Guantánamo, these factors did not
exist. There was no reason to disobey a federal court order on the base.173
The Court stated “no Cuban court has jurisdiction” over these issues.174
Ultimately, no laws, other than those of the United States, apply to the
base.175
These prudential concerns reflect how past Supreme Court decisions
resolved ambiguities about the Constitution’s extraterritorial reach. In
reaching its decision in Boumediene, the Court applied analysis from Reid
v. Covert.176 The standard developed in Reid was whether a court’s
166. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765. The government argued “that the Constitution had no
effect [on the base], at least as to noncitizens, because the United States disclaimed
sovereignty in the formal sense of the term.” Id.
167. Id. at 834–35, 835 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
500–01 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
169. Id. at 770 (explaining that “[n]o Cuban court has jurisdiction over” the base).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 748–52 (describing “prudential concerns” in applying the writ in historic
Scotland or Hanover).
172. Id. at 750 (referring to concerns of “comity and the orderly administration” in
habeas jurisdiction from Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)).
173. Id. at 751.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 759–62 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74, 77 (1957)) (describing how
Reid rejected a “rigid and abstract rule” when determining where constitutional protections
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enforcement of a constitutional provision would be “impracticable and
anomalous.”177 These “practical considerations” permitted the Court to
distinguish Johnson v. Eisentrager, precedent viewed by the Government
and the dissenting opinions as prohibiting habeas application in nonsovereign territory.178 The Court also explained that a formalist
interpretation would require “a complete repudiation of the Insular
Cases’ . . . functional approach” to legal questions about the extraterritorial
reach of the Constitution.179
Building on this practical reading, the Court offered three factors to
determine whether Guantánamo detainees benefit from the writ of habeas in
the Constitution’s Suspension Clause: (1) the detainee’s citizenship and
status, coupled with the “adequacy of the process” regarding how this status
was determined; (2) the nature of the apprehension and detention sites; and
(3) “practical obstacles inherent” in the detainee benefiting from the writ. 180
This three-point test devised in Boumediene has guided American courts
since then to decide when habeas extends to places where the United States
has exercised overseas authority, such as in Afghanistan.181
For “practical obstacles,” the Court stated there are few such barriers to
applying habeas on Guantánamo. The Court acknowledged that additional
expenditures and resources would be needed to comply with habeas
proceedings on Guantánamo, but military forces and civil courts have
functioned simultaneously. Likewise, the base has served functions beyond
military operations, such as housing migrants, refugees, long-term
residents, and workers.182 By emphasizing these prudential aspects, the
Court identified factual elements specific to base detention and American
authority to begin requiring the application of legal norms on the base.
The decision offered significant illumination regarding the Constitution’s
role at a location characterized by legal ambiguities. It substantially
extend).
177. Id. at 759–60 (citing Reid, 354 U.S. at 74-75) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
178. Id. at 762 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950)). In Eisentrager,
the Court determined enemy aliens detained in Germany had no access to habeas because
they were never within “territory over which the United States is sovereign.” Eisentrager,
339 U.S. at 778.
179. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764.
180. Id. at 766.
181. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding habeas
does not extend to detention in Afghanistan but also finding that the citizenship and status
factor did side with non-Afghan detainees held in Afghanistan).
182. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770.
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impacted the law and policy of detentions. District courts secured the ability
to review detainee habeas petitions. Detainees could challenge their
detention before an independent judge. Congress and the President were
required to guarantee court access. On the base, military officials have had
to protect the habeas rights of the detainees, in the form of attorney access
and the ability to file habeas petitions.
D. Anomaly Adapts to Block Habeas and Facilitate Detentions
Despite repeated constitutional holdings in the Guantánamo Cases,
American law adapted to encourage overseas detentions. Extraterritorial
anomalies adapted even after the Supreme Court confirmed that
constitutional habeas extends to the base. They evolved to shield the actions
of the President and Congress on Guantánamo from judicial intervention,
over a decade and a half after detentions began. This process modified legal
ambivalences on the base to the constitutional holdings. The Supreme
Court, in the Guantánamo Cases, took great strides to clarify that the legal
protections in the Constitution, laws of war, and procedural due process
apply to military detentions on the base. Since then, the judiciary has
determined that the political branches possess almost unfettered authority at
this overseas location.183 The subsequent decisions have permitted
continued detentions, fueling new forms of legal anomaly on the base.
Three observations stand out regarding how legal norms continue to be
suspended at Guantánamo: (1) judicial habeas powers have been weakened;
(2) congressional and presidential politics keep detainees there, fueling a
need for anomaly; and (3) these trends support American authority overseas
separated from the Constitution.
First, the overseas habeas powers have been restricted despite the broad
pronouncements in Boumediene. After that, courts have been unable to
enforce habeas release orders to bring base detainees into the United States
and have similarly been unable to stop their transfer from the base.184
Instead, habeas courts deferred to executive detention justifications. The
deferential nature of this jurisprudence grows out of the ambivalent findings
of the court in Boumediene. There, the Supreme Court preserved the
judiciary’s jurisdiction on the base with habeas review, but not much more
183. See generally Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013
U. ILL. L. REV. 551 (2013).
184. These limited judicial powers are evident in Kiyemba I, II, and III decisions, see
generally Ernesto Hernández-López, Kiyemba, Guantánamo, and Immigration Law, supra
note 17.
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was protected for detainees.185 The substantive content of this law, used in
habeas proceedings, was left explicitly undecided. The Supreme Court
stated that it “does not address the content of the law that governs”
detention.186 In other words, detainees and the base benefit from the
Constitution’s protections and access to courts, but the court explicitly
avoided commenting on what law governs these detentions or habeas
proceedings.
The ambiguous underpinning of Boumediene’s holding became apparent
when habeas courts addressed what to do about detainees who were found
not to be enemy combatants and their detentions no longer were legally
justified. The issue developed after seventeen Uighur detainees had their
habeas petitions approved, and a district court ordered them released into
the United States, in August of 2008.187
In July of 2002, twenty-two Uighur detainees were brought to
Guantánamo.188 Uighurs are a Turkic population who practice Islam in the
Xianging region of China. Uighur separatists have violently resisted
Chinese rule, with some receiving training Afghanistan before September
2011. The Uighur detainees were captured in Pakistan and suspected of
receiving terrorism training in Afghanistan.189 The United States paid a
bounty to have them turned over.190 Before Boumediene, courts had found
that they were not enemy combatants and their detention was unlawful.191
185. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795.
186. Id. at 798.
187. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34, 43 (D.D.C. 2008),
rev’d sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2010), vacated, 559 U.S. 131
(2010).
188. For this history of how these detainees arrived at Guantánamo, see Linda
Greenhouse, Saved by the Swiss, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/saved-by-the-swiss/; Caprice L. Roberts,
Rights, Remedies, & Habeas Corpus—The Uighurs, Legally Free While Actually
Imprisoned, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2009); Citizens of China, N.Y. TIMES: GUANTÁNAMO
DOCKET, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo/country/china (last
visited Mar. 20, 2019).
189. Before Boumediene, the Government had conceded that all of the Uighur detainees
were not unlawful enemy combatants. See In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F.
Supp. 2d at 35. For the most developed discussion of their reasons for leaving China, stay
and training at a Uighur camp in Afghanistan, flight from Afghanistan after the U.S. military
campaign, and capture in Pakistan in December 2008, see Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834,
837–38, 843–44 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
190. See Greenhouse, supra note 188.
191. See Parhat, 532 F.3d at 850-51.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

1144

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1109

Courts confirmed that they did not take up arms or have any plans to attack
the United States or its allies.192 Between 2008 and 2010, seventeen of these
Uighur detainees accepted resettlement options in Albania, Bermuda, Palau,
or Switzerland.193 In 2010, the remaining five received offers to relocate in
Palau or Switzerland, but they chose not to accept these offers. Many of
these legal issues remain confidential and under seal due to their diplomatic
sensitivity. Foreign countries were resistant to receive these detainees
because China has exerted strong diplomatic pressure to deny them
resettlement offers.194 These facts resulted in three sets of cases, named
Kiyemba v. Obama,195 addressing aspects of how to effectuate a habeas
release order on Guantánamo.
The issue of releasing base detainees through habeas court order initially
developed in the cases Kiyemba v. Obama I and Kiyemba v. Obama III.
These decisions held that courts have limited, almost non-existent, powers
to order the remedy of release on the base.196 In 2009, Kiyemba I considered
whether courts may order release into the United States for base detainees
when they cannot be relocated home or to a third country.197 Kiyemba I held
that the detainees could not be ordered into the United States because
immigration law doctrine bars their entry and courts do not have this power
at an extraterritorial location.198 After the Supreme Court granted and then
denied certiorari review in 2009 and 2010 respectively, this decision was
reinstated in Kiyemba III.
192. See id.
193. See Letter from Elena Kagan, U.S. Solicitor General, to William K. Suter, Clerk of
the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 19, 2010), https://www.pegc.us/Kiyemba_
Merits/08-1234_gov_letter_brief_20100219.pdf.
194. China wanted the Uighurs returned to China. For descriptions of China’s position,
see generally Clifford Coonan, Beijing Says 17 Released Guantánamo Uighurs Are
Terrorists Who US Should Hand Back to China, IRISH TIMES (June 12, 2009, 1:00 AM),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/beijing-says-17-released-guantánamo-uighurs-areterrorists-who-us-should-hand-back-to-china-1.782316; Ritt Goldstein, Is China Spying on
Uighurs Abroad?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 14, 2009), https://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Asia-Pacific/2009/0714/p06s12-woap.html.
195. See generally Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I), 555 F.3d 1022, 1023 (D.C. Cir.
2009), vacated, 559 U.S. 131 (2010) (per curiam), reinstated on remand, 605 F.3d 1046,
1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 954 (2011); Kiyemba v.
Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba III), 605
F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
196. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1029; Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 516.
197. Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1023.
198. Id. at 1029.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/5

2019]

DETAINING ISIS

1145

These cases show how habeas doctrine requires courts to defer to the
executive and continue the detention because the political branches have
plenary authority over immigration authority. Kiyemba I held that the
judiciary cannot second-guess or review political questions regarding
detainees’ entry into the United States.199 Deference is a product of a
nation’s right to exclude or admit foreigners. The opinion highlighted how
constitutional norms can be avoided on the base. The Kiyemba I court
stated that aliens do not possess due process rights, contained in the
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, without property or presence in the
United States.200 For aliens, entering the United States is a privilege and not
a right.201 The terms of this privilege are political and thus cannot be
reviewed by the judiciary.202
In 2010, in Kiyemba III, the court of appeals reinstated its judgment and
opinion from Kiyemba I.203 The court emphasized that Congress had spoken
on the matter by prohibiting expenditures to relocate detainees into the
United States. At this point, the court referred to early legislative efforts to
prohibit detainee entry into the United States by barring the use of military
funds for this purpose.204 Setting an example for later, more expansive, and
restrictive congressional legislation, the court interpreted military spending
bills as effectively barring detainee relocation in the United States.205 The
doctrinal lesson from Kiyemba I and III is that, despite access to habeas
proceedings, the base and detainees may be excluded from constitutional
rights protections due to required deference, congressional legislation, and a
location outside the United States. From this, habeas doctrine adapted to
emphasize deference to the political branches, with court review approved
for overseas petitioners but limited court powers. From a TWAIL
perspective, this system allows for overseas imperial authority to function
without judicial checks.
Another example of checked habeas developed simultaneously in
Kiyemba II regarding the same detainees. The court in that case held that
199. Id. at 1028-29 (holding that the Judiciary does not have the power to intervene when
the Executive Branch is continuing efforts to resettle the detainees).
200. Id. at 1026 (holding that district court language “suggest[s] that the court may have
had . . . due process . . . in mind”).
201. Id. at 1027.
202. Id. at 1026.
203. Kiyemba III, 605 F.3d 1046, 1047 (2010).
204. Id. at 1047-48.
205. Id. at 1048.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

1146

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1109

habeas did not entitle detainees to notice of their transfer to contest their
relocation to countries that may torture or persecute them.206 The detainees
argued that notice was necessary because they would be tortured or
persecuted if they were returned to China. The court held that habeas does
not require this notice and that concerns for judicial deference precluded
court inquiry into the Executive Branch’s relocation efforts.
The reasoning behind the court’s holding in Kiyemba II, that the
judiciary cannot review issues involving torture to stop relocation, was that
the issues are political. It noted that when the Executive Branch has
declared a policy to refuse to transfer detainees to a country that likely will
torture them, a “court may not second-guess [this] assessment.”207 These
issues belong to the political branches and not to the judiciary.208 The
detainees argued that their claims derived from the Convention Against
Torture, which prohibits their removal to a country where they may be
tortured.209 The court explained that it could review these claims only when
there is a challenge to a final immigration removal order.210 Because
detainees were not in immigration proceedings, they could not use
Convention claims to challenge a removal order.
The Supreme Court did not review the Kiyemba II issues. On a few
opportunities, more than one justice dissented in the Court’s denial of
certiorari in these matters, when a Guantánamo detainee argued that habeas
court powers could stop their transfer to other countries that would torture
them. Three justices provided a dissenting opinion in the denial of certiorari
in 2010 regarding a transfer bar for a detainee resettled in Algeria who
feared torture there.211 The next year, two Justices dissented on a similar
denial of certiorari.212
The Kiyemba cases illustrate the pervasive legal ambiguity on the base—
detainees are found to be illegally detained but have few constitutional
206. Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d 509, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
207. Id. at 516.
208. See id. at 514.
209. Id. at 514–15 (referring to the G.A. Res. 40/128, at 2, Status of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 13,
1985), as implemented in 8 U.S.C. § 1231).
210. Id.
211. Mohammed v. Obama, 561 U.S. 1042 (2010) (mem.) (Breyer, J., Ginsburg, J., and
Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (denying the detainee’s petition to stay his transfer explaining the
petition raises “important questions . . . not resolved” by Munaf).
212. Khadr v. Obama, 563 U.S. 1016 (2011) (mem.) (Breyer, J., and Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
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rights thereafter. Kiyemba I and III generally held that the detainees are
overseas and thus American law has limited effect. Kiyemba II held that the
detainees have limited rights because they are not in the United States. In
essence, their current location on a base, under neither American nor Cuban
sovereignty, justified so much about detention for over a decade. At the end
of 2013, the last three Uighur detainees left the base and were sent to
Slovakia after earlier attempts to settle them in the United States and Costa
Rica had failed due to political pressures, domestically and from China. A
TWAIL reading of Kiyemba II finds that extraterritorial habeas is powerless
to allow courts to stop detainee transfers. Kiyemba II effectively stops
courts from enjoining detainees’ release from the base, and Kiyemba I
keeps them on the base. In TWAIL terms, after the Guantánamo Cases
reinterpreted sovereignty in functional terms to affirm habeas on the base,
courts later reasoned that detainees could not count on court powers to
release them or to limit their transfer.
The D.C. Circuit also held that detainees in Afghanistan did not benefit
from habeas court powers.213 For Bagram detentions in Afghanistan, nonAfghan detainees were at one point found to benefit from habeas.214
Finding that habeas did extend, the district court reasoned that the foreign
detainees were taken to Afghanistan to avoid any rights protections, but
eventually these foreign detainees were released.215
The second way legal norms are excluded on the American base is
through political choices—from four Presidents and Congress.216 Political
efforts by multiple administrations and foreign governments to relocate
detainees have failed to end the legal limbo. These controversies are
typically presented as “the failure to close Guantánamo,” by detention
critics, or as needed policies in the War on Terror, by the Government and
detention supporters. This Article argues that these challenges are the
213. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding habeas does not
extend to detention in Afghanistan but also finding that the citizenship and status factor did
side with non-Afghan detainees held in Afghanistan).
214. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
215. Id. at 235.
216. The Trump administration has argued in court that detainees should remain on the
base and that existing restrictions to their transfer are legal, see Presidential Executive Order
on Protecting America Through Lawful Detention of Terrorists, January 30, 2018
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-protectingamerica-lawful-detention-terrorists/, see e.g. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to Writ
of Certiorari, Paracha v. Trump, No. 17-6853 (June 2018).
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consequence of an anomalous presence on Guantánamo for over a century.
After habeas courts were confirmed to have jurisdiction over the base,
detainees there could not point to court powers to release them or stop their
transfer. This policy effectively keeps the base and detainees mostly under
the purview of the political branches and excluded from court powers. As
such, the policy choices by Presidents and Congress became the most
significant determinations keeping detainees on the base.
These ambivalences are negotiated between perceived political need and
avoiding legal obligations. The apparent need is to continue detentions,
while legal exclusions focus on limited judicial oversight and rights
protections for detainees. Specifically, the President has restricted abilities
to take detainees off the base, and Congress effectively requires detainees to
stay on the base.217 These developments all support an overarching decision
to continue detentions on the base. Detainees remain prisoners of the law’s
unclear role on Guantánamo and the political choice to keep them detained.
Legislation, executive action, and court rulings shield these choices and
continue to separate Guantánamo from important legal norms. These
include judicial power to order detainee release and similarly to stop their
transfer despite concerns for torture overseas. But there is a lack of political
will to close the detention center or move the detainees. This context paints
a picture on how anomaly has adapted at Guantánamo.
As detentions continue with legal approval, the base symbolizes a state
of permanent war and emergency, with judicial deference and political
choices overshadowing the constitutional checks affirmed in the
Guantánamo Cases. Since 2008, American law’s role on the base reflects
what Mary Dudziak describes as “wartime.”218 Contrasted with the notion
of peacetime, wartime is the permanence of war in the United States and
how it endures, not just as an exception to peace.219 Dudziak describes how,
since the Cold War, the United States has been in a perpetual state of
military conflict, which lacks any official declaration of war or formal
surrender by an enemy.220 This wartime is important because for most
Americans their domestic lives are not as impacted by military conflicts as
217. See generally David J.R. Frakt, Prisoners of Congress: The Constitutional and
Political Clash over Detainees and the Closure of Guantanamo, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 179
(2012); Donald Trump Says Guantanamo Bay Releases Must End, BBC NEWS: U.S. &
CANADA (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38502539.
218. MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 3 (2012).
219. See id. at 4.
220. Id. at 6.
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they were before. This separation weakens the “democratic vigilance”
Americans have on their leaders in Congress and in the White House to
initiate, maintain, and end military conflict.221 Dudziak explains how the
War on Terror became the military response to the September 11 attacks,222
and consequently war has become unbound in terms of time and space. This
conflict is not against a precise enemy, nor does it transpire in a specific
location. Guantánamo detentions reflect one extension of this reality. There,
habeas powers are checked by deference to military or foreign relations
need, detention pursuant to the 2001 AUMF with no determined end, and
the choices of Congress and the President to keep detainees in custody. This
Article asks if the legal justifications for wartime on Guantánamo,
employed by courts and political leaders, will also frame detentions in the
ISIS conflict.
The third lasting attribute of the Guantánamo Cases and their progeny is
that they support extraterritorial authority separated from the Constitution.
They directly examined legal anomalies overseas and effectively
transformed them into questions about separation of powers and judicial
deference. Courts addressed how detention policies suspended legal norms
by taking advantage of control overseas and mitigated sovereignty on the
base. In detention policies since 2002, the President and Congress decided
to suspend legal norms on the base, the most important being detainees’
access to court powers.223 Between 2004 and 2008, the Supreme Court
addressed these suspensions in a recurrent manner. Review of law on the
base appears more incremental and repeated when this permissive doctrine
includes appellate court decisions for hundreds of detainees since 2008 and
certiorari denials by the Supreme Court. As recently as 2014 in the
certiorari denials, Supreme Court justices suggested that the legality of base
detentions should be questioned.
This result reflects a historic process of how anomaly, empires, and legal
doctrine evolve. Accordingly, courts review extraterritorial controversies.
Their decisions establish the legal contours of overseas authority in the
form of empire. As defined by Michael Doyle, empires exert political
authority overseas and limit local sovereignty at these locations.224 Empires
rely on legal ambiguities to govern overseas. These anomalies operate when
legal norms are suspended at a location due to perceived political need, a
221.
222.
223.
224.

See id. at 136.
See id. at 100.
See Frakt, supra note 217, at 183-205.
See MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES 45 (1986).
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process defined by Gerald Neuman.225 By repeatedly addressing these
ambiguities in court disputes, empires justify their overseas authority.
Historian Lauren Benton describes how, for centuries, European empires
relied on these ambiguities and litigation about them. 226 Over time, the
ambiguities justified extraterritorial governance. Litigation regarding these
locations played a crucial role in extending geographic control. As doctrine
developed in recurrent litigation, empires acquired political legitimacy to
govern abroad. In this manner, law supports imperial authority beyond its
domestic borders.
The Guantánamo Cases followed the ambivalent trend set by American
law and policy on overseas territories. The historic question of “does the
Constitution follow the flag?” was made current by asking how American
law applies to base detentions. These cases did not fully exclude the base
from constitutional protections, nor did they fully include it. Only certain
provisions of the Constitution apply. This policy reflected places like
Puerto Rico, where only parts of the Constitution apply. It is most evident
in Boumediene, with its confirmation that only limited legal protections in
the Constitution extend overseas. In Boumediene, the court referred to the
Insular Cases, devised a century prior to retain overseas possessions, as
justification for its reasoning. With rulings in the Guantánamo Cases, the
political branches can later continue with detentions as long as detention
policies conform to specific limits suggested in the opinions of the court.
The political branches and subsequent litigation have had the task to
determine which provisions of the Constitution apply overseas. But they
benefit from the ambivalent legal doctrine facilitating detentions on the
base.
In TWAIL terms, Guantánamo’s contribution to the law of empire is that
extraterritorial sovereignty is re-conceived. With this, habeas is approved
overseas and detainees enjoy laws of war protections, while political
determinations keep them on the base. As sovereignty no longer bars
extending these privileges, the power of politics keeps detainees there
indefinitely. Kiyemba I and II shackle habeas court powers. Congress bars
detainee release, limiting the use of funds and the President’s options. As
such, three Presidents decided to keep them on the base and argued that
conflicts pursuant to the 2001 AUMF justified military custody without any
225. Gerald Neuman refers to this as an anomalous zone, see supra note 76.
226. See BENTON, supra note 92, at 29–31, 33; LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL
CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400–1900, at 2, 10 (2002).
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conceivable end. In this light, base detentions—blessed with deference and
political inaction—illustrate how wartime shapes the role courts play. This
doctrine adapted an overseas base, acquired in an imperial war in 1898, to
the law needed to conduct the War on Terror, which lacks any limits in
terms of time, location, or enemies. For detainees brought to Cuba in 2002,
captured mostly in Afghanistan or Pakistan, wartime is quite evident, even
if usually forgotten in the United States. In sum, the empire’s overseas
territory supported the legal means to conduct an endless war.
II. An American Is Captured on the Outer Rims of Syria
(A Disturbance Is Felt)
In September of 2017, the SDF encountered Doe at a screening point on
an active battlefield in Syrian territory controlled by ISIS. He surrendered
to the SDF, told them “that he was an American citizen, and asked to speak
to [American] officials.”227 The SDF transferred him to U.S. military forces
in the region.228 They determined that Doe was an enemy combatant and
detained him at a U.S. facility in Iraq from September 2017 to October
2018.229 In litigation, the U.S. Government explained that this
determination was based on evidence that Doe was a member or supporter
of ISIS, specifically regarding the circumstances of his surrender, his
statements, and proof of ISIS membership.230 It added that the military “had
not set out to capture [Doe].”231 In court papers, the Government explained
that it was deciding the appropriate course of action for Doe, either to
criminally prosecute him, to continue detaining him as an enemy
combatant, or to relinquish custody “to another sovereign with its own
legitimate interest in him.”232 On June 6, 2018, the Government suggested a
different course when it notified the district court that it intended to release
Doe and return him to Syria where he had been captured over nine months
prior.233 For months, the Government and Doe negotiated a settlement. This
would avoid releasing him in a warzone and stop his detention. On October
29, Doe was transferred to Bahrain where he could be free and keep his
227. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 747; Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195, 197 (D.D.C. 2018).
230. Doe, 889 F.3d at 747; Doe, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 197-98.
231. Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9, at 2.
232. Id.
233. For a description by Doe’s lead attorney, see Hafetz, supra note 7. For an analysis
of what the release proposal entails, see Ramirez & Robinson, supra note 7.
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American citizenship, while pursuant to the settlement his American
passport was canceled.234
Soon after Doe’s capture, American courts became the vehicle to
determine whether legal norms protect Doe or support deference to the
Executive Branch’s detention authority.235 This issue is centrally concerned
with the age-old question, “Does the Constitution follow the flag?”236 In
Doe’s case, it was about whether a citizen is entitled to constitutional
habeas protections in Iraq and whether constitutional norms check military
activity in the ISIS conflict in Syria and Iraq. After October of 2017 the
Government and Doe, represented by the ACLU, litigated a writ of habeas
corpus petition to potentially release Doe or to determine that his detention
is lawful. A year later, he was released without any court ruling on the
legality of his detention.
At first, and for months, the military tried to deny Doe any access to an
attorney.237 This followed a similar pattern to when the military had tried to
foreclose counsel access to asylum seekers and detainees on Guantanamo
after 1991 and 2002, respectively.238 For Doe, the Government argued in
court that habeas privileges did not apply to military detention in Iraq. The
234. See ACLU Press Release, supra note 3; Savage, Callimachi & Schmitt, supra note
2.
235. For a description of the timeline involving the case’s litigation, see ACLU Press
Release, supra note 3.
236. The reference to the Constitution following the flag comes from 1901 popular
commentary on the Supreme Court and politics, but is often applied to the legal relationship
between the United States and overseas possessions. It serves a conceptual and doctrinal link
between questions about Puerto Rico after 1898, the American military in World War II, and
the War on Terror. See generally RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015);
see also Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba, supra note 36, at
175-76; Pedro A. Malavet, The Inconvenience of a “Constitution [That] Follows the
Flag . . . But Doesn't Quite Catch Up with It”: From Downes v. Bidwell to Boumediene v.
Bush, 80 MISS. L.J. 181, 198-204 (2010); Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the
Flag? The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law 8-9 (UCLA Sch. of Law Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-34, 2009).
237. See ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 54 (D.D.C. 2017) (stating that for
“over three months” Doe remained “without access to counsel”); see id. at 60 (summarizing
Government arguments that Doe does “not have the immediate right to meet with counsel”).
238. For descriptions of litigation seeking attorney access to base detainees, see Michael
Ratner, How We Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp: The Intersection of Politics and
Litigation, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 187, 197–98 (1998); Benjamin Wittes & Hannah Neprash,
The Story of the Guantánamo Cases: Habeas Corpus, the Reach of the Court, and the War
on Terror, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 513–54 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/5

2019]

DETAINING ISIS

1153

Government effectively claimed that, in the allied fight against ISIS, the
Constitution did not follow the flag. On December 23, 2017, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia found that the ACLU had
standing to bring a habeas action on Doe’s behalf.239 One month later, the
same court issued a preliminary injunction requiring that the Government
provide seventy-two hours’ notice before transferring Doe to another
country.240 The Government appealed this order in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Meanwhile the district court accepted brief
submissions to review the merits regarding whether this detention was
unlawful.241
The court’s decision created two paths for Doe’s habeas case. One path
regarded whether a court can require the Government to provide notice
before transferring him. This path mostly asked if courts have to defer to
the diplomacy and military powers of the Executive Branch. It focused on
procedural aspects of notice and the normative terrain of political versus
judicial authority. This Doe v. Mattis path resulted in a few court decisions.
On May 5, the court of appeals sided with Doe and affirmed the district
court’s orders.242 Specifically the court affirmed the January 23 order that
the Government provide seventy-two hours’ notice before transferring Doe
to any other country.243 It also affirmed a second order from April 19 that
barred the government from transferring Doe from U.S. custody.244 The
January 23 order mentioned two countries as potential transfer options,
while the April 19 order was specific to only one country.245 This country
has been unnamed publicly but is widely believed to be Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, another litigation path was set to review whether the military
could legally detain Doe. For these issues, this Article describes only the
pleadings the parties submitted between January and March of 2018. The
district court never convened any hearings regarding the merits of Doe’s
detention. The argumentation focused on several issues: (1) whether
citizens can be detained without express congressional authorization, (2)

239. See ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2017).
240. Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195, 197 (D.D.C. 2018).
241. See Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 13;
Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9.
242. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 747–49.
245. Id.
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whether the ISIS conflict is included within the AUMFs from 2001 or 2002,
and (3) whether Doe is an enemy combatant.246
A. Habeas Prudently Reaches an Armed Conflict Zone Overseas
Three months after detention, Doe’s doctrinal saga began with
confirmation that he was entitled to habeas court review by a district
court.247 Affirming that habeas privileges extend to a military detainee in
Iraq, this court decision serves as the doctrinal link between Doe and the
Guantánamo Cases. The most important aspect of the court’s opinion is that
it affirms that habeas applies overseas without emphasizing sovereignty. It
does not examine whether the location is American territory or whether it
occurs within American sovereignty.248 Instead, habeas extends to what the
court described as a “restricted U.S. military zone” and an "armed conflict
zone.”249 Arguably, the court could have emphasized that this was not
American territory, that there was no international agreement requiring that
American forces answer to a court, or that deference is necessary to military
and wartime need.
Like with Boumediene, the district court’s prudential reasoning affirmed
that a military detainee can use habeas proceedings to contest detention. 250
For Doe, the court began setting a legal course focused on where, when,
and how habeas applies. For this court order, “when” regarded three months
after detention began.251 The court dismissed the Government’s argument
that three months fell within its “reasonable amount of time” to hold a
detainee to determine their status before a court can begin habeas review.252
The military had already determined that Doe was an enemy combatant
during the three months of custody.253 “Where” referred to Iraq, a
“restricted U.S. military zone” where the ISIS conflict is ongoing.254 For
246. See infra Section II.C.
247. ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 60 (D.D.C. 2017).
248. Id. at 60 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733-34 (2008)) (suggesting
Boumediene only permits habeas relief after a “reasonable amount of time” to determine
whether a detainee is an enemy combatant, stating that nothing in Boumediene “restrains”
granting immediate access to the detainee, and finding habeas relief cannot be denied
because of the Government argues it is “no easy matter”).
249. Id. at 60, 55.
250. For a description of the prudential approach, see supra note 165.
251. Id. at 59.
252. Id. at 60.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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“how” detention takes place, the court emphasized the military’s experience
with administering habeas.255 The court balanced the detainee’s interests
and military need. It noted that the military “cannot strip the detainee of this
right to habeas relief simply because . . . access ‘would be no easy
matter.’”256 It added that the military is skilled in these difficulties and that
the Government has provided no reason why “such inconvenience should
outweigh the necessity of providing the detainee with the access to counsel
he requested months ago.”257 This first habeas decision for Doe upheld that
the writ does in fact apply overseas in a warzone and emphasized that
prudential concerns outweigh arguments that habeas does not extend to
overseas military detention.
In TWAIL terms, courts began to ask how American authority to
conduct military detention overseas was impacted by detention of a citizen
in a conflict that was not expressly authorized by Congress. This question
could be answered from one of two general perspectives: (1) a role of
habeas courts is to check unlawful detention, or (2) national security
justifies deference to military and foreign relations choices. Compared to
Guantánamo fifteen years earlier, these TWAIL questions no longer
focused on aliens, territory under American control, or bars to
extraterritorial habeas.
B. For Citizen Detainees, Transfers Require Prior Notice
A month later, legal wrangling over Doe’s detention shifted to focus on
citizen privileges and limits on court deference to military and foreign
relations powers. News observers reported that the United States was trying
to transfer Doe to another country.258 Public records, however, had not
named any specific country, but Saudi Arabia was the expected location as
Doe is also a Saudi Arabian citizen.259 The district court’s next decision
from January 23 set the course for the Doe v. Mattis path over issues about
notice provided by the Government. This resulted in one court of appeals
decision, emphasizing citizenship and the laws of war, to affirm that courts
can require notice from the military before transferring a detainee.260

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Savage, Schmitt & Goldman, supra note 10.
Id.
See Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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In its January 23 decision, the district court made two important
holdings: (1) a positive statement, such as a treaty or statute, was required
to legally transfer an American citizen to another state’s custody, and (2)
the government had to provide seventy-two hours’ notice before
transferring Doe.261 These holdings effectively placed the burden on the
Government and highlighted that Doe’s American citizenship warranted
increased protections. Similar to Boumediene’s extraterritorial framework
and the district court’s prior perspective, its reasoning emphasized a
prudential means to regulate military detention.262
Additionally, the district court noted a positive statement from Congress
is needed in order to legally transfer citizens.263 Here, a treaty or statute
would meet these requirements. This rule comes from the Supreme Court
case Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, which addressed the
extradition of American citizens without a treaty.264 In that case, the
Supreme Court found that the Executive Branch lacks authority to transfer
an American without a “treaty or legislative provision.”265 Referring to
Valentine, the district court effectively looked to congressional support for
the military’s transfer plan. It also noted that the Executive Branch cannot
easily transfer a citizen to a foreign country. For Doe, this reasoning was
particularly significant because Saudi Arabia is arguably not foreign to
him—he is a citizen of both Saudi Arabia and the United States.266 The
court could have emphasized his nexus to Saudi Arabia to distinguish
Valentine requirements.
Importantly, noting factual aspects about Doe’s status and his capture,
the court distinguished Guantánamo-era precedents that defer to Executive
Branch choices on detainee transfers.267 Decided the same day as
Boumediene, Munaf v. Geren found that habeas does extend to citizens in
overseas military detention, but that if a foreign sovereign requested them

261. Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195, 198, 201 (D.D.C. 2018).
262. Id. at 200.
263. Id. at 198.
264. 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936).
265. Id.
266. For why Saudi Arabia is thought to be one of the countries where the United States
intended to transfer Doe, see Robert Chesney, Enjoining the Transfer of a US-Saudi Citizen
to Saudi Arabia: A Doe v. Mattis Update and Initial Preview, LAWFARE (Apr. 23, 2018, 7:00
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/enjoining-transfer-us-saudi-citizen-saudi-arabia-doe-vmattis-update-and-initial-preview.
267. Doe, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 198–99.
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for criminal prosecution, American courts could not block their transfer.268
Specifically, the district court reasoned that Doe was not in any criminal
prosecution by another country, so deference to the Executive Branch did
not preclude blocking Doe’s transfer.269 It also reasoned270 that since Doe
was a citizen, it did not need to follow a similar ruling in Kiyemba II,271
involving Guantánamo detainees who tried to challenge a transfer to China.
For Doe, the district court emphasized Valentine reasoning rather than a
Munaf perspective. Both cases speak to the issue of transferring citizens
from American control, but neither case exactly addresses an alleged citizen
enemy combatant held overseas. These two battling precedents
characterized the Doe v. Mattis saga, with Munaf requiring deference to the
executive and Valentine emphasizing citizen rights and congressional
authorization.
The district court noted that prudential limits on the military justify a role
for courts in national security matters.272 Here, these functional checks were
balancing citizen rights versus military need and requiring the Government
to provide notice after negotiating any potential transfer. It did this to limit
the need to defer to claims of military necessity, conflict zone, or
diplomatic sensitivities. The Government argued for deference because the
military was detaining Doe, detention was in an undisclosed location in
Iraq, and it continued to negotiate with foreign states to potentially receive
Doe.
Lastly, this decision framed a role for courts in national security by
referring to War on Terror cases, which emphasize the significance of
checks by the three branches. It quoted Hamdi, which held that the right to
“contest the factual basis for . . . detention” is not outweighed by diplomatic
interests evident in effectuating a transfer.273 For the issue at hand, notice
did not prevent the Government from conducting transfer negotiations;
accordingly the equities did not balance with the Government’s deference.
Moreover, the court identified a public interest in a citizen’s right to
“freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint.”274

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
Doe, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 199.
Id.
Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Doe, 288 F. Supp. 3d at 199-200.
Id. at 200 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004)).
Id. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)).
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After the district court, these matters were placed squarely within legal
debates about whether Congress authorized the ISIS conflict and
consequently this detention. Even though Doe just sought to be released or
prevent a transfer after months of detention, the appellate opinions
emphasized separation of powers and executive deference. On May 7,
2018, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision and its two orders, siding with the detainee.275 The court of appeals
affirmed the order from January 23 requiring that the Government provide
notice before transferring Doe and another order from April 19 stopping the
Government from transferring him to a specific country.276 In April, the
Government provided the district court seventy-two hours’ notice after it
reached an agreement with an undisclosed country to accept Doe.277 In
simple doctrinal terms, the opinion of the court extended the Valentine rule
to overseas military detention and highlighted protecting citizen rights. The
dissenting judge emphasized Munaf and the need for executive deference
for foreign relations and military matters.278
To adapt prior precedent to the case, the opinion relied on three
significant judicial maneuvers, citizenship, contesting detention, and a
prudential approach. Specifically, it noted that citizens cannot be forcibly
transferred without prior positive authorization,279 detainee transfers must
comply with laws of wars and Hamdi protections for enemy combatants,280
and prudential reasoning limits deference in foreign relations and military
matters.281 Accordingly, the court made important legal findings regarding
who could be detained and how military detention was conducted. Put
simply, a citizen cannot be transferred forcibly without a statute or treaty.
But if the detention is pursuant to laws of wars, enemy-combatant detainees
can be transferred in such a manner. In this military conflict, it was unclear
if Doe was an enemy combatant under the AUMF from 2001 or 2002.
Applying this reasoning, the court voiced skepticism as to whether the ISIS
conflict was legally authorized.282 Consequently, it directed the district

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Doe, 889 F.3d at 748.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 768-69 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 748.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 758.
Id.
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court to review these issues. The court then questioned if Doe was an
enemy combatant and could be detained without any charge.
First, citizen rights framed the court’s ruling. The court approached the
question of who can be transferred as a balance between a foreign state’s
interest in the transfer and the detainee citizen’s rights.283 The Government
argued that the foreign state had an interest in Doe’s relocation.284 Like with
Doe’s name and any identification of the country, the specific interest was
not publicly disclosed but was presented in closed-chamber proceedings.285
Siding with Doe, the court found a citizen’s rights more convincing than
another state’s interest in the transfer.286 In this case, the detainee’s status—
a dual United States-Saudi Arabia citizen—was used to counter the need for
deference because of the foreign state’s interest. Such arguments would
typically defer to notions of comity between states, sovereignty, foreign
relations, or military need.287 But the court explained that it knows of “no
instance” in which “an American citizen [was] found in one foreign country
and forcibly transferred . . . to the custody of another foreign country.”288
The court reasoned that American citizenship guarantees significant
rights for military detention and detainee transfers.289 It noted that deference
“[is] different” when an alleged enemy combatant is a citizen, “even [for]
one seized on a foreign battlefield.”290 It held that citizens have a
fundamental right to return to the United States.291 This triggers the
Valentine requirement that a transfer must be pursuant to a statute or treaty,
which the United States does not have with the country that agreed to
receive Doe.292 Moreover, it found that dual citizens are entitled to these
rights.293 Arguably, the court could have concluded that Doe’s Saudi
Arabian citizenship provides a legal means to relocate him. But this would

283. Id. at 749.
284. Id. at 751.
285. Id. at 764–65, 768.
286. Id. at 749.
287. Id. at 748 (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008); Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S.
524 (1957)).
288. Id. at 748, 756.
289. Id. at 749.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 757 (quoting Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 139 (1952)).
292. Id. at 755, 757.
293. Id. at 757 (quoting Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 349 (1939) (“[A] dual citizen ‘is
entitled to all the rights and privileges of . . . citizenship.’”)).
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have effectively diluted the privileges of American citizenship for dual
citizens.
Additionally, the court found that such rights are not lost when a citizen
leaves the United States.294 If that were the case, then citizens would be
subject to forcible transfers when they are overseas. For Doe, the
Government argued that his rights as a citizen were diminished since he
voluntarily traveled to the Syrian conflict.295 The court rejected this
argument. It noted that a citizen’s voluntary travel plus any foreign state’s
interest in the citizen would amount to a forcible transfer. At length, the
judges in the court of appeals proceedings posed hypothetical questions
about Americans who voluntarily traveled overseas and were then forcibly
removed.296 The Government noted that Munaf focused on deference to a
foreign state’s interest and a detainee’s voluntary travel to Syria, both of
which diminished protections for a citizen.297 The court, however, rejected
applying Munaf’s reasoning because Doe was detained under the law of
war and Munaf involved a criminal prosecution.298 Doe, on the other hand,
had not been charged with any crime and instead was detained pursuant to
executive authority. To rely on Munaf’s bar to habeas, the court explained,
would be to give the Executive Branch with unilateral authority to “dispose
of a [citizen’s] liberty,” and this cannot be done “unless . . . [a] statute or
treaty confers the power.”299 The precedents the Government referred to did
not support such an “expansive vision of unilateral Executive power
over . . . citizen[s].”300 Importantly, the Executive Branch’s power to detain
Doe comes from the law of war.
Second, the laws of war provided a means to stop detainee transfer—
siding with Doe. A significant doctrinal move in Doe v. Mattis was to place
the dispute clearly within the law-of-war framework, also called the laws of
armed conflict.301 With this doctrine, the court began to chart a course for
how military detention can be legally conducted when fighting ISIS. It
referred to established War-on-Terror habeas doctrine and effectively
294. Id. at 755-56.
295. See id. at 752.
296. Id. at 756-57.
297. Id. at 755-56
298. Id. at 753, 757.
299. Id. at 755 (quoting Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9
(1936)).
300. Id. at 755–56.
301. Id. at 758-59.
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required proof of conflict authorization by Congress.302 If the court did not
impose this requirement, it would be affording the Executive Branch
greater deference and sanctioning a way to avoid a series of checks on how
detainees are treated.
Specifically, the court found that, because it was not known whether Doe
was an enemy combatant under the existing AUMF, which does not
expressly refer to ISIS, the Government could not transfer him without
meeting the Valentine requirements.303 This forced the court to examine if
the AUMF and enemy combatant status applied to Doe. Since he was a
citizen, these two factors were needed to detain him absent statutory
authority. Accordingly, the court of appeals noted this unsettled doctrinal
terrain. The court notes that without any inquiries yet into the executive’s
war authority and enemy combatant classification, it sees “no basis to set
aside” the injunctions baring Doe’s forcible transfer.304
The court’s concern for Congressional authorization addressed the
Government’s claim that it can transfer Doe to an ally in the ISIS conflict
because he is an enemy combatant. Specifically, the court made two
holdings regarding military detainee transfers: (1) proof is required that
there is a legal authorization to use force against ISIS, and (2) Doe is
afforded “an adequate opportunity to challenge the Executive[] [Branch]
determination that he is an [ISIS] combatant.”305Regarding these two
points, Hamdi previously established that citizens could be detained, that
detention could be for the conflict’s duration, and that “due process
demands some system for a citizen-detainee to refute his classification.”306
For Hamdi in 2004, the power to detain flowed from the 2001 AUMF.307
This detention power was not so clear for a citizen detained in Iraq for the
ISIS conflict over a decade later.
The court of appeals effectively withheld from deciding whether Doe’s
transfer as a military detainee was legal, because the legality of Doe’s
detention had not yet been addressed. It found that because two conditions
had not been met, the Government could not transfer Doe under the laws of
302. See id.
303. Id. at 748-49 (finding no basis to set aside district court orders in the absence of
inquiries on “legal authority for the Executive [Branch] to wage war” and an “opportunity
for the citizen to contest” an enemy combatant determination).
304. Id. at 748-49.
305. Id. at 758.
306. Id. at 759 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004)).
307. Id. at 758.
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war.308 These conditions were congressional authorization for the ISIS
conflict and a chance to rebut enemy combatant determination. At the time
of the appeals court proceedings, the district court had not yet had hearings
on the issue of the AUMF from 2001 or 2002 or on whether implied
executive authority ensured that Doe’s detention was legal. Referring to
whether an AUMF authorized the conflict, and consequently permitted
military detention, the court essentially sought a confirmation that Congress
has authorized the conflict.309
The court made another doctrinal clarification specific to military
detainee transfers. It held that the power to transfer a detainee stems from
the Executive Branch’s power to detain.310 Highlighting the potential harms
of any transfer, the court explained that any transfer of Doe would be
irrevocable.311 Transfer is different than the determination of whether
detention is legal, since detention can be revoked but a transfer to another
state cannot. The involuntary nature of Doe’s proposed transfer
distinguished it from Kiyemba I precedent. In that case, Guantánamo alien
detainees had no right to request transfer to the United States and thus
asked to be transferred to another country.312
Third, the court emphasized that practical factors minimize the need to
defer to executive authority.313 In this light, the court stepped away from the
wide deference the government requested. This prudential reasoning
effectively minimizes a line between court review and those circumstances
requiring deference because they involve military or foreign relations
matters. Executive Branch justifications for greater deference because of
military need were rejected. The court quoted Hamdi’s refusal to exercise
deference, reiterating that the military has “limited institutional
capabilities” to administer detainee challenges.314 Also citing Hamdi, it
refuted that a good-faith determination by the military is enough. For
citizen detainees, more is needed.315 Similarly, the court noted that the
military determination to transfer Doe was not a battlefield judgment since
he had been held for months before the Government decided to transfer
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 765.
See id. at 758-59.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 761–62.
See id. at 768.
Id. at 759 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527 (2004)).
Id. at 763 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537).
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him.316 Moreover, Executive Branch arguments opposing the need to
provide notice before the transfer were described as “blanket preapprovals”
or “sort of carte[ ]blanche.”317 Notice was needed because the Government
had made late requests and provided no information on where a citizen
would end up.318
The court then emphasized the significance of Hamdi’s prudential
analysis and how it does not diminish military or war powers.319 Here, the
issue was not about battlefield concerns; instead, the focus was on
transferring a detainee.320 Executive Branch authority to wage war was
“cabined” by Hamdi.321 Accordingly, “warmaking” was “unlikely” to suffer
any “dire impact.”322 This reasoning was justified by noting that it is “vital”
not to “short shrift . . . the values” America holds dear or the privileges of
citizenship.323 For citizens, “‘interest in being free from physical detention’
is the ‘most elemental of liberty interests.’”324
In TWAIL terms, Doe v. Mattis suggested important limits on overseas
detention authority following the Guantánamo battles regarding territory
and aliens. These restrictions include mandating that classifying a detainee
as an enemy combatant requires force authorization from Congress and the
opportunity for the detainee to contest the classification. Hamdi-based
limits were significant and took a big step away from any finding that the
executive can detain without statutory authority or with inherent powers.
Similarly, such limits shaped how or when a transfer can happen.
Citizenship and, perhaps more important, dual-citizenship, motivated much
of the district court and court of appeals reasoning. Lastly, courts held that
three months was far beyond a reasonable time to hold a military captive
without charging him or providing any process to contest enemy-combatant
status.325 In sum, doctrinal clarifications for detainee treatment, transfer
limitations, privileges for dual citizens, and time limits for battle captives
should help guide detention operations in the future. Ultimately, they will
likely help avoid legal black holes, as seen for the three months with Doe
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id. at 764.
Id. at 767–68.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 763-64.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 766 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)).
See, e.g., ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2017).
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after September 2017 and for years on Guantánamo between 2002 and the
Hamdi and Rasul decisions.
C. Avoiding Debates on if ISIS Detention is Legal (a.k.a. is ISIS the Same
Enemy from 2001?)
Doe v. Mattis avoided a finding regarding whether an AUMF provided
legal authority for the conflict against ISIS. This case never resulted in a
ruling on whether the Executive Branch had the authority to detain Doe.
And that was the most significant issue in the year-long ordeal—it could
have imposed judicial checks on the ISIS conflict. There have also been
congressional efforts and failed litigation attempts to limit this conflict.326
The issues Doe raised—regarding ISIS, the AUMFs, and congressional
authorization—motivated prior litigation, inspired congressional proposals,
and will do the same in the future. With Doe, though, like with
Guantánamo, the fact that there was an individual in military detention
meant that litigation could potentially overcome bars posed by political
question, standing, and mootness issues. A habeas petitioner argued that
executive choices to detain resulted in someone suffering harms, that this
harm would persist, and that a habeas court could stop them. The most
significant aspect of this concerned whether military detention was a
political choice blessed with deference or whether a habeas court could
determine this custody’s lawfulness. After 2004, the Guantánamo Cases
confirmed habeas roles for courts over military detention, then for a large
set of detainees, captured in an explicitly authorized conflict, and held on
American controlled territory.327 For Doe, he was the only detainee, and he
was not on territory under American control. Accordingly, the detention
debate focused on judicial roles and whether deference was due.
In the end, the district court never had merits proceedings, so there was
no decision. One way to view the case is that the threat of a legal ruling
motivated the Executive Branch to end detention by political means, with a
326. For a description of a recent AUMF proposal in Congress, see Goodman, supra note
19. Since the United States began its military campaign against ISIS in 2014, President
Obama and members of Congress have proposed new AUMFs to authorize the conflict. For
a discussion of authority claimed by President Obama for the conflict and the distinct
proposals for new AUMFs, see WEED, supra note 22. A district court found that a
government agent’s claim that the conflict against ISIS was unconstitutional posed a
political question. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated sub
nom. Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
327. See supra Section I.A.
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negotiated settlement and diplomacy. Importantly, during the pleadings
stage, the Government stipulated many facts about Doe’s capture, and his
past confirmed links to ISIS. But Doe’s filings only contested the authority
to detain him.328 The pleadings were limited to the law and did not address
the facts from his past or capture. Doe’s lawyers chose to focus only on the
authority to detain and not how Doe specifically fit within any enemy
combatant classification.
This Article describes these arguments about detention authority to map
out the evolution of habeas doctrine after Guantánamo, Al Qaeda, and the
Taliban.329 Four general issues framed these questions in Doe v. Mattis: if
Congress authorized detention, if deference is due to executive choices, if
citizenship limits detention, and if detention authority is implied.
Specifically, congressional authorization debates determine whether the
AUMFs from 2001 or 2002 encompass ISIS as an enemy and thereby
authorize detention of captives in this fight. Deference debates focus on
whether military choices to detain or to classify enemies preclude any court
involvement or whether habeas jurisdiction can review this detention.
Debates on citizen detention examine if the Non Detention Act (NDA)
prohibits detention without a congressional statute, if the AUMFs satisfy
NDA requirements, and if citizens can be subjected to military detention.
Issues of implied authority examine if inherent powers of the executive as
Commander in Chief of the military provide detention authority and if
congressional approval of spending on this conflict confirms executive
detention authority.
First, debates about congressional authorization were shaped by the
Government’s functional reading of the AUMFs and by Doe’s arguments
that they referred to different circumstances and that their texts did not
include ISIS. Put simply, a functional approach would favor the
Government, while a focus on the AUMFs’ text or circumstances would
help Doe. The Government argued that the 2001 AUMF covered groups
that were part of or substantially supported the September 11 attacks, and
that this included associated forces.330 ISIS fit within this description since
328. See Hafetz, supra note 8; Chesney, supra note 27.
329. This focuses on arguments presented by Doe. See, e.g., Petitioner’s Response to
Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 13; Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Response to
Petitioner’s Response to Factual Return, supra note 14. It also focuses on the Government
arguments. See, e.g., Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9; Respondent’s Response to
Petitioner’s Response to Factual Return, supra note 14.
330. See Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9, at 12.
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it originated from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a chain of continuity was
uninterrupted, and ISIS continued the objectives of Al Qaeda.331 This
approach urged a functional reading of what the 2001 AUMF encompassed
and how enemy classifications adapted over time.332 For this reason,
Congress authorized the use of force in 2001 and 2002, and habeas courts
have supported this reading with detentions in Iraq, Guantánamo, and
Afghanistan.333 The Government similarly contended that Congress
authorized a conflict in 2002 in Iraq to establish security and that this
included fighting insurgents like ISIS in the region.334 In other words,
Congress authorized these conflicts with few limits. Even those few limits
did not specify time for either AUMF or location for the 2001 AUMF, as
such detention of those determined to be enemy combatants by the military
is legal.
Focusing on the AUMF’s duration and textual limits, Doe contended that
ISIS was distinct from who Congress designated as enemies in 2001.335 The
time elapsed since the authorization and text of the resolution confirms this
reading. ISIS is a wholly different group.336 It did not exist in 2001 or in
2002. As such, Congress could not have designated it as an enemy or
contemplated detention for its members a decade before its birth. ISIS’s
formation in 2014 represented a rupture from AQI,337 breaking the link with
any AUMF’s scope from 2001 or 2002.
Specific to the 2002 AUMF, Doe argued that it was focused on ending
Saddam Hussein’s rule and maintaining security in Iraq and the region.338
Congress did not contemplate enemy designation in the Syrian Civil War,
which started in 2011, or ISIS formation, which started in 2014. An
interesting argument not raised is that ISIS is often regarded as an offshoot
of the Baathist political party, which held the most important positions in
the Hussein dictatorship in Iraq.339 In sum, Doe’s contention that there was
331. See id. at 5-12 (describing ISIS history and its connections to Al Qaeda).
332. See id. at 17.
333. See id. at 12-17.
334. See id. at 20.
335. See Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 13, at 9, 1328.
336. See id. at 14.
337. See id. at 14-15.
338. See id. at 29.
339. See Myriam Benraad, How Saddam Hussein’s Old Ideology May Have Contributed
to the Modern Islamic State, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 18, 2018 1:12 PM EST),
https://theconversation.com/how-saddam-husseins-old-ideology-may-have-contributed-to-
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no detention authority argued that Congress’s prior AUMFs did not
mention ISIS and did not contemplate these detention circumstances (a
fifteen-year time lapse since the last AUMF, new insurgent groups, and a
Syrian Civil War).
Second, a contest between the executive’s political authority and habeas
court roles over military detention frames the deference debate. Here, the
Government requested wide deference regarding its choices to: detain Doe;
classify him as an enemy combatant; and decide what process, if any, was
due to inform him of these designations and contest them. 340 Deference is
not a clear switch, with courts entirely precluded or entitled to full scope of
review. Instead, it is a spectrum. The most obvious need for greater
deference would be for battlefield, military strategy, or diplomatic choices,
such as if the day Doe was captured the military had to worry about habeas
review. The longer detention lasts after capture, or when the Government
does not identify its detention authority, deference becomes less likely. As
the Rasul and Hamdi cases showed, over two years of detentions for
hundreds of men, courts are less willing to provide wide deference. For
Doe, four months into his custody, when he filed court papers on the merits
of detention, the district court had already ordered attorney access and
found that, for those purposes, there were no functional reasons to preclude
habeas in an “armed conflict zone” or a “restricted U.S. military zone.”341 It
is doubtful that the district court would months later provide greater
deference in merits issues because of urgency or combat necessity.
The result of the deference debate would have depended on a court
choosing between one of two viewpoints—either that this detention is
solely a military choice or that courts have a role in reviewing this
detention. Deference would be seen as focusing on military choices that
include detaining enemies. In contrast, affirming habeas review over
military detention emphasizes judicial roles in preventing arbitrary
detention and in ensuring separation of powers. The Government argued
that deference was due for military detentions.342 These were political
the-modern-islamic-state-84937.
340. Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Response to Factual Return, supra note 14, at
4.
341. See ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d. 53, 55, 60 (D.D.C. 2017).
342. See Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Response to Factual Return, supra note
14, at 5-6 (arguing the use of “military force against [ISIS] . . . implicates concerns that” are
“constitutionally committed to the political branches,” this deference extends to the legality
of AUMF detention); id. at 8-9 (arguing deference is due for war powers and for determining
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questions specific to choices such as that ISIS is an enemy and that Doe
falls within this classification. The Government referred to precedent on
military issues, including detention.343 This focus suggested that these
powers were all committed to the executive. Specific to the ISIS conflict, it
cited a court decision that the Executive Branch solely determined who was
an enemy per the 2001 AUMF.344 The decision denied challenges that ISIS
was not covered by an AUMF and that the conflict was unconstitutional.345
Thus, the justification for deference looks to structural reasons why
executive choices, in particular from the military, were beyond the scope of
court review.
To the contrary, Doe argued that broad deference was not required by
structural commitment to the executive and instead emphasized that habeas
courts possess confirmed roles over military detention matters.346 As
mentioned above, Doe argued that the AUMFs do not expressly or clearly
encompass ISIS. Moreover, deference is not due when military detention
occurs away from the battlefield.347 Here, Doe was captured and, only
months later, received attorney access as required by the court.348 It is
conceivable, however, that habeas review of detention authority could have
followed months after attorney access. Hamdi is thus presented as rejecting
the idea that military detention is outside the review of courts.349
Specifically, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that detention is
unilaterally committed to one branch. Likewise, Boumediene and the many
habeas detention cases since then show how courts can review who is or is
not an enemy combatant.350 Doe’s justification for review points to
significant constitutional harms with arbitrary detention and disrupting

if the AUMF covers ISIS).
343. See id. at 8-10.
344. See, e.g., Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016), vacated sub nom.
Smith v. Trump, 731 F. App’x 8 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
345. See id. at 298, 303.
346. Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Response to Factual
Return, supra note 14, at 2, 5-6 (referring to examples of habeas review and denial of wide
deference for detention, including Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004); and Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir.
2010)).
347. See id. at 2.
348. See ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2018).
349. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-21.
350. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 740-46.
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separations of powers. This line of reasoning emphasizes a functional
means to determine how courts have conducted this review in the past.
The third important debate focused on which protections from military
detention extended to citizens. Here, court precedent on citizens detained
pursuant to an AUMF did not squarely extend to Doe. Hamdi found that
military detention was legal for a citizen who was an enemy combatant and
caught during battle in Afghanistan.351 It emphasized its reasoning applied
to “narrow circumstances.”352 Doe was different. When captured at an SDF
checkpoint, Doe was fleeing Syria and was not part of any combat. Court
rulings have never entirely settled the question if citizens in other scenarios
can be legally detained overseas pursuant to the AUMF. Supreme Court and
appellate-level cases decided early in the War on Terror also did not neatly
apply to Doe. Rumsfeld v. Padilla focused on detention for a citizen caught
while returning to the United States and found that there was no jurisdiction
in this matter.353 Four justices agreed that there was jurisdiction and agreed
with the lower-court finding in these circumstances that the NDA
prohibited citizen detention.354 Congress confirmed this undetermined
detention scope for citizens in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA).355 In section 1021(e), it essentially stated that it did not add to nor
did it eliminate any basis to detain citizens pursuant to the 2001 AUMF.356
The NDAA did this in addition to section 1021(d), which codified habeas
court rulings on military detention and explicitly stated it did not add to the
scope of detention authority.357 In Hedges v. Obama, a court of appeals
explained that in section 1021(d) Congress “express[ed] resolution of a
previously debated question about the scope of AUMF authority” and in
1021(e) it “simply says nothing at all” regarding the detention of citizens.358
351. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (stating it “answer[s] only the narrow question” regarding
detention of a citizens involved in combat and caught in Afghanistan).
352. See id. at 519.
353. See generally 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
354. Id. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For an elaborate discussion on the NDA
prohibiting this detention, see Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2003), overruled by
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (2005).
355. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125
Stat 1298.
356. See id. § 1021(e), 125 Stat at 1562 (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to
affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens . . . .”).
357. See id. § 1021(d), 125 Stat at 1562 (“Nothing in this section is intended to limit or
expand the authority of the President or the scope of the [AUMF].”).
358. 724 F.3d 170, 191-92 (2nd Cir. 2013).
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Doe argued that his detention violated the NDA, which requires statutory
authority to detain a citizen. Congress passed the NDA in reaction to the
internment of Japanese and Japanese-Americans during World War II. 359
The Act simply states, “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”360
Contending that it made his detention illegal, Doe emphasized that the
NDA’s purpose was to avoid these kind of executive detentions carried out
in World War II.361 Because of this, Congress sought to ensure that its input
was required to imprison or detain citizens. Doe referred to court rulings
and the finding of four justices in Hamdi that the NDA was not limited to
civil detention.362 Furthermore, the AUMFs did not satisfy the NDA’s
statutory requirement, since it did not expressly refer to detention.363 In
sum, Doe’s argument that military detention for citizens was illegal focused
on the purpose of the NDA, the textual limits it imposed, and the
inapplicability of the 2001 AUMF.
The Government contended that the NDA did not prohibit Doe’s
detention and that courts have found military detention of citizens legal.364
Two reasons limited the NDA’s application. One, it is silent on military
detention and was intended to apply only to civil detention, which was the
type of detention used in Japanese and Japanese-Americans’ internment.365
Those detentions were not conducted by the military. Second, the AUMFs
satisfied the NDA’s congressional requirements.366 The AUMFs were
passed by Congress and supported repeatedly in appropriations ever
since.367 Moreover, Hamdi affirmed that the 2001 AUMF’s authorizations
included legal military detention for a citizen. To support this argument, the
Government cited cases before the AUMFs approving military detention for
citizens. These cases, however, did not rule on overseas detention of a
359. See Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 13, at 6-7.
360. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2018).
361. See Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 13, at 6.
362. See id. at 7 (citing Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 479 n.3 (1981) and Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545-47 (2004) (plurality opinion) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
363. See id. at 9 (describing the argument that the 2001 AUMF satisfies the NDA as
making “a mockery of the clear-statement requirement”).
364. See id. at 7.
365. See Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Response to Factual Return, supra note
14, at 12 n.14.
366. See id. at 14.
367. See id. at 8.
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citizen.368 As such, Doe’s detention in Iraq and capture in Syria could be
argued as distinct from precedents. In sum, the Government’s arguments
focused on a different purpose for the NDA and precedent on citizen
detention but not in entirely analogous circumstances.
Fourth, questions about implied powers or implied approval shaped the
arguments about Doe’s detention. The Government argued that
Commander-in-Chief powers, in Article II of the Constitution, provided the
military authority to conduct this kind of detention.369 Here, the justification
is that the executive has the clear power to command military forces
overseas. Detention is part of this effort. In court papers, the Government
referred to past use of military force. As an example, it noted that recent use
of force in Libya, the Government cited military campaigns without
congressional authorization, including Libya in 1986, Panama in 1989,
Somalia in 1992, Bosnia in 1995, Haiti in 1994 and 2004, and Yugoslavia
in 1999.370 Doe contended that no court had approved this reading of the
executive’s “inherent” authority for detention.371 In fact, with Congress not
authorizing this detention, even prohibiting it, the executive’s authority was
limited.372 The court’s opinion noted that the Government provides not a
“single decision” that upholds citizen detention indefinitely.373 It added that
references to inherent or unilateral authority for the executive’s military
powers are in terms of defense from attacks, not detention of a citizen—and
this power does not include indefinite detention after capture on a
battlefield.374 The Government also contended that Congress’s funding of
the ISIS conflict repeatedly since 2014 was a ratification of the conflict and
that this action was sufficient to authorize detention in the conflict.375 Doe
responded that funding the military is not the same as expressly authorizing
a conflict, much less providing approval for detention of a citizen.376 The
368. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942); In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 144
(9th Cir. 1946).
369. Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9, at 25.
370. See id. at 26 (quoting Authority to Use Military Force in Libya: Memorandum
Opinion for the Attorney General 7 (Apr. 1, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya_0.pdf).
371. Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 13, at 36.
372. See id. at 37.
373. Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Response to Factual
Return, supra note 14, at 10.
374. Id.
375. Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9, at 22.
376. Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 13, at 33.
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opinion in Doe v. Mattis added that the plurality of the court in Hamdi
refuted such funding arguments.377
In sum, Doe v. Mattis resulted in one American citizen, alleged to be a
member or supporter of ISIS, released from military confinement and
transferred to Bahrain. From a doctrinal light, the case confirmed that
habeas courts do have a role reviewing executive detention policies, while it
also clarified significant aspects involving detainee transfers. In military
policy terms, the dispute illustrated how detention questions depend on
confirmed executive war authority and enemy designations made pursuant
to this authority. While Doe v. Mattis only involved one person versus
hundreds of detainees, as in Guantánamo and Bagram, the case shines light
on how future legal debates on military detentions will transpire. As the
War on Terror likely enters its second decade, its enemies are not clearly
defined states, terrorist organizations change, and combat operations move
to new locations, these debates on the law of detention are likely imminent.
III. Habeas Overseas: The Force Awakens or a Phantom Menace?
Doe v. Mattis illustrates how overseas military detention has entered a
new episode, not just because it regards an undisclosed location, an
unnamed citizen, and an alleged ISIS combatant. More importantly, the
case raised legal questions that have been brewing for years about when the
Executive Branch has military detention authority. This case implicated
issues on citizen rights, the role of courts, and enemy classification—
significant constitutional and national security matters. They will appear
again in detentions as the ISIS conflict enters a new phase with its global
reach and as the Al Qaeda and Taliban conflicts approach their second
decade.
This section identifies what John Doe’s one year of confinement
demonstrated about who can be detained and how, where, and when
military detention is checked by habeas. Describing this issue, it refers to
simple Star Wars titles of “The Force Awakens” and “The Phantom
Menace.” The Force Awakens points to military confinement that stresses
transparency for detainee treatment and for the sources of detention
authority. In recent Star Wars movies, “The Force Awakens” tells the story
of how the orphan Rey strengthens the New Republic, with a big push in
the fight against the empire. Alternatively, a Phantom Menace points to
377. Id. at 34 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 547 n.3 (2004) (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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long-term confinement with minimal information. With a Phantom Menace,
courts agree that the Executive Branch determines detention authority. In
the movies, the Phantom Menace presents how the Emperor uses claims of
emergency and security to eliminate the Republic and its institutions to
form an Empire.
A. Who Can Be Militarily Detained, Transferred, or Released
Doe v. Mattis provides some new clarity for “who” can be detained,
transferred, or released. There is added clarity when addressing citizen
detainees, specifically regarding their transfers. This is an example of when
the “Force Awakens.” The court of appeals stated that even for alleged
enemy combatants “seized on a foreign battlefield,” when they are
American citizens, less deference is owed to the Executive Branch.378
Evidenced in year-long proceedings, courts emphasized that John Doe was
an American citizen and that this fact mandated different legal treatment
than for alien detainees.379 Importantly, Doe is a dual citizen of the United
States and Saudi Arabia, with limited connections to or history living in the
United States. Arguably, courts could deemphasize his citizenship by
entertaining calls not to recognize birthright citizenship, even though this
would go contrary to Supreme Court precedent since 1898.380 Likewise,
Doe’s dual citizenship could have been the basis for treating him as an alien
or at least to identify a strong connection with another state’s interest.381
The limits for citizens in military detention remain undefined by
courts.382 So far, courts have affirmed that habeas jurisdiction extends to
detention in Iraq and that the United States cannot forcibly transfer a citizen
detainee. But the legal authority to keep Doe in military detention remains
unresolved. Before Hamdi, lower courts reviewed this issue, while in 2012
Congress determined it would not make change to what courts have
378. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 749 (D.D.C. 2018).
379. See id. at 748-49.
380. See generally John C. Eastman, Born In The U.S.A.? Rethinking Birthright
Citizenship in the Wake of 9/11, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 167 (2007) (suggesting Fourteenth
Amendment interpretations denying birthright citizenship); Ernesto Hernández-López,
Global Migrations and Imagined Citizenship: Examples from Slavery, Chinese Exclusion,
and When Questioning Birthright Citizenship, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 280 (2008)
(describing how birthright citizenship is settled by United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
649 (1898)).
381. Judge Henderson highlights these points in her dissent and suggests that Doe’s
transfer is legal. See Doe, 889 F.3d at 776-77 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
382. See Vladeck, supra note 30.
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authorized or not regarding military detention for citizens.383 For the
question, “can the military detain citizens in overseas conflict,” the answers
are less clear. In practical and factual terms, Doe was in military detention
for over a year without a release ordered by a court or carried out by the
military. No court ruled whether this detention was legal, despite the fact
habeas jurisdiction had been affirmed for eight months. The Government
never took Doe out of military custody; rather, it tried to transfer him early
in 2018 and then after settlement negotiations from July to October. Doe
and the Government submitted relevant briefs on the merits of detention
three months after the district court affirmed that habeas applied.384 In these
briefs, Doe conceded the facts, which contended that he was an ISIS
member or supporter. Instead, he primarily contested that the AUMFs and
the Constitution provide detention authority for the military.385
More precisely, the court of appeals found that citizen detention requires
congressional authorization and that it is not clear, as of May 2018, whether
the AUMFs satisfy this requirement.386 Arguably, the 2001 and 2002
AUMFs do not cover ISIS, which did not exist when Congress authorized
military force, and they refer to different conflicts in terms of location and
circumstances. Alternatively, ISIS is likely an offshoot of AQI and thus
falls within the 2001 AUMF’s contemplation. Moreover, the 2002 AUMF
authorizes restoring security in Iraq and the region, which could include
military detention of ISIS combatants and supporters. No court has found
that the executive has inherent authority to keep an American citizen in
overseas military detention indefinitely.387 It is similarly undetermined
whether either of the AUMFs encompass ISIS, whether ISIS members
qualify as enemy combatants for detention, and whether supporters of ISIS
fall within this classification.
What is clear per the court of appeals is that a citizen cannot be forcibly
transferred to another country if the citizen is not classified as an enemy
combatant. Here, Doe challenged two relocation options.388 The
383. For a discussion about the NDAA 2012 confirming this lack of clarity and the
limited nature of rulings on citizens in military detention in Hamdi, Padilla, and World War
II era cases, see discussion supra notes 358-61.
384. See ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2017); Respondent’s
Factual Return, supra note 9; Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra
note 13.
385. Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 13, at 2-4.
386. See Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 759 (D.D.C. 2018).
387. See supra Section II.C.
388. Doe, 889 F.3d at 756.
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Government argued that a foreign state’s interest in him was more
important than his consent for transfer.389 But the court of appeals refuted
that the Executive Branch had this transfer power. It explained that such a
power would effectively allow citizen repatriation to another country when
a citizen traveled outside the United States.390 These findings emphasized
that, for detainee transfers, citizenship is important. The appellate court’s
holding in Doe v. Mattis extended prior Valentine reasoning, for civil
extradition, to military detention.391 Similarly, even though this transfer
power and deference to foreign relations support alien detainee relocations,
for citizens, such Kiyemba II reasoning does not apply.392
Highlighting the significance of this ruling, the Government decided to
pursue Doe’s release soon after the court of appeals affirmed two things. 393
Accordingly, the Court denied this transfer power and it asked for districtcourt proceedings on the AUMF, detention authority, and enemy
combatants.394 Releasing Doe was a better option for the Government than
continuing with habeas litigation and gambling on its shaky detention
authority. It can be assumed that for litigation purposes, the Government
did not want to risk numerous potential problematic findings by a court.
These may have included potential findings that: the AUMFs had expired,
they did not apply to Syria or Iraq, ISIS was not an enemy covered by an
AUMF, or the facts did not support that Doe was an enemy combatant as a
member or a supporter of ISIS. After seven months of detention, the
government stopped asserting that Doe was an enemy combatant.
The court of appeals noted that Doe’s transfer could take place without
his consent if he was an enemy combatant and detained pursuant to the
AUMF and the laws of war.395 This classification, however, was never
confirmed by a court. Accordingly, the transfer power is interrelated with
potential findings on enemy combatants and more broadly with what
Congress authorized and what it contemplated as an enemy.

389. See id.
390. See id.
391. See id. at 755.
392. Id. at 753, 761.
393. See Hafetz, supra note 8; Chesney, supra note 27.
394. See Robert Chesney & Steve Vladeck, The Latest – and Perhaps Last – Twist in
Doe v. Mattis, LAWFARE (June 6, 2018 10:21 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/latest-andperhaps-last-twist-doe-v-mattis.
395. See Doe, 889 F.3d at 759.
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Since it cannot yet be confirmed whether ISIS qualifies for military
detentions under either AUMF and the laws of war, a Phantom exists. The
Menace part is less clear. Doe’s unclear designation as an enemy combatant
is isolated to this one individual. Commentators often state that overseas
military detention of American citizen members or supporters of Islamic
insurgents has been quite limited. So far, Hamdi was one for the Taliban
over sixteen years ago, and Doe is another for ISIS in Iraq in 2017.396 Were
John Doe one of many other military detainees in American custody, then a
Phantom Menace could be more easily envisioned. In that scenario, unclear
legal norms would govern many military detentions in secret and outside
the purview of court or Congress’s authorization, like with Guantanamo
between 2002 and 2004. For the United States, “who” can be detained is
not clearly a Phantom Menace.
Recent developments point to the possibility of changed policy for
citizen detainees in the ISIS conflict. For instance, the United States has
brought similar ISIS captive citizens from Iraq and Syria to criminal
proceedings in American courts.397 Because these disputes are more open to
public observation, this appears to be less of a Phantom and less of a
Menace.
Things become murkier when looking at ongoing detention of ISIS
captives who are not American citizens. If Doe is placed in the context of
thousands of ISIS detainees of many nationalities since 2014 in Iraq, Syria,
and Kurdish areas,398 then Doe v. Mattis reflects a more global Phantom
Menace. These detentions strain resources for Iraqi, Syrian, and Kurdish
authorities, where conflicts are ongoing, cease-fires are liminal, and
reconstruction has begun. The fear is that ISIS detainees will recruit
members while in detention. Likewise, the speed of Iraqi criminal
proceedings and rampant death penalty punishments catch the eye of
396. Id. at 768; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 571 n.3 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing two World War II cases as the only two court of appeals cases supporting
detention without trial, both of which were members of enemy forces, In re Territo, 156 F.2d
142, 143-45 (9th Cir. 1946); Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432 (10th Cir. 1956)).
397. Two citizens have been transferred to federal courts for the Northern District of
Indiana and Eastern District of Michigan charged with providing material support to ISIS or
making false statements to the FBI, respectively. See Ellen Nakashima & Missy Ryan, Two
Americans, Transferred to U.S. from Syria, Will Be Tried in Federal Courts, WASH. POST
(July 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/two-americanstransferred-to-us-from-syria-will-be-tried-in-federal-courts/2018/07/24/c474b72e-8f9911e8-8322-b5482bf5e0f5_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.cc69e8daf28f.
398. See supra note 62.
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human-rights groups and foreign powers.399 Many such detainees are in
Kurdish-controlled areas, which lack international recognition as an
independent sovereign state.400 Many detainees are foreigners from
neighboring states and Western states. Many of their home countries have
been reluctant to accept them. Already, some states have renounced their
citizenship.401
The American stance on ISIS detainees and citizenship is evolving. After
a year of detention, the United States did not try to revoke Doe’s citizenship
in court or administrative proceedings. This position may change. The
United States has refused to recognize the citizenship of a woman detainee.
Her name is Hoda Muthana, She was born in the United States, lived in the
country her whole life, previously had American passports, and then
relocated to Syria to support ISIS.402 The United States State Department
and President Trump have stated that Hoda Muthana is not a citizen, despite
being born in the United States, and she will not be allowed to return to the
country.403 Muthana has expressed a desire to return to the United States
undergo any criminal proceeding.404 Her parents in the United States

399. See supra note 62.
400. See supra note 62.
401. See supra note 62.
402. For descriptions of the factual circumstance and legal issues at play, see Dara Lind,
The Fight over Whether ISIS Recruit Hoda Muthana Is a US Citizen, Explained, VOX (Feb.
22, 2019), https://www.vox.com/world/2019/2/22/18236309/hoda-muthana-isis-citizentrump-pompeo; Jonathan Shaub, Hoda Muthana and Shamima Begum: Citizenship and
Expatriation in the U.S. and U.K., LAWFARE (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
hoda-muthana-and-shamima-begum-citizenship-and-expatriation-us-and-uk, Steve Vladeck,
Unpacking (Some of) the Legal Issues Surrounding Hoda Muthana, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 20,
2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/62659/unpacking-some-of-issues-surrounding-hodamuthana/.
403. Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, Statement on Hoda Muthana
(Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/02/289558.htm; see also
Rukmini Callimachi & Alan Yuhas, Alabama Woman Who Joined ISIS Can’t Return Home,
U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/20/world/
middleeast/isis-bride-hoda-muthana.html?module=inline; Peter Zampa, One-on-One with
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: Trade with China, the ISIS Bride, and Otto Warmbier's
Death, FOX: WEST DAKOTA (Mar. 03, 2019, 9:08 PM), https://www.kfyrtv.com/
content/news/One-on-one-with-Secretary-of-State-Mike-Pompeo-Trade-with-China-theISIS-bride-and-Otto-Warmbiers-death-506635611.html.
404. See Rukmini Callimachi & Catherine Porter, 2 American Wives of ISIS Militants
Want to Return Home, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/
us/islamic-state-american-women.html.
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recently filed a lawsuit challenging the State Department’s position.405
Nevertheless, a Phantom Menace is forming in the region, especially when
looking at military detentions since ISIS began losing territorial control.
The United States position on citizen detainees and their return may be
changing as well.
B. How Military Detention is Legally Authorized and Subject to Challenges
As for “how” habeas challenges detentions, Doe v. Mattis continues a
trend that began with Hamdi in 2004 for enemy combatants, and it further
clarifies judicial power over citizen detention and citizen transfers. As such,
it reflects a “Force Awakens” by confirming review and input by Congress
and the courts. Although Doe was released after a year with no charges,
courts pushed legal questions about the ISIS conflict and detentions
pursuant to this military force.406 The courts essentially asked how
detention was consistent with Congress’s express objectives. Likewise, as
multiple rounds of court proceedings transpired, information about the
detainee, his treatment, and detention policy came to public light.407
The significance of the judicial role stands out in the facts described by
the first court opinion from December of 2017. It ordered the military to
provide “immediate and unmonitored access to the detainee” and barred his
transfer.408 This decision came after noting how the military had treated the
detainee, which included: over three months of detention; no criminal
charge; unknown identity; lack of attorney contact; and limited contact with
anyone.409 For months, Doe was only able to speak with law enforcement,
military, and Red Cross officials.410 The district court cited Boumediene to
justify court power to issue its order.411 More importantly, it explained that
courts may entertain habeas petitions after a reasonable time to determine
405. A district court judge recently ruled that the lawsuit will not be expedited, leaving
Muthana overseas for now. Charlie Savage, Judge Declines to Speed Up Case of Alabama
Woman Who Joined ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4. 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/
us/politics/hoda-muthana-hearing.html. For the complaint filed by Ahmed Ali Muthana, see
Expedited Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of
Mandamus, Muthana v. Pompeo, No. 1:19-cv-00445 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000169-133a-d847-abe9-b3fa54f60001.
406. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 405.
407. See, e.g., id.
408. See ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 60 (D.D.C. 2018).
409. Id. at 55, 59.
410. Id. at 55, 59.
411. Id. at 60.
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whether the detainee is an enemy combatant.412 Here, over three months of
detention permit habeas review, with a court able to issue an order and
examine whether the detention is legal.
Specifically, Doe v. Mattis describes how habeas applies in two ways.
First, it confirmed that habeas powers can stop the transfer of citizen
detainees. It reached this conclusion by affirming that a statute or treaty is
needed to transfer an American citizen.413 This effectively adapted
precedent on civil extradition to the military context. It looked to what
Congress has approved in a statute or treaty to specifically authorize when
an American can be taken to another country. For Doe, this positive
authority did not exist, as there was no statute, and no treaty with the
countries open to accept him. Thus, the government asked for deference to
transfer based on foreign relations and military need. Munaf confirms that
transfers are legal if the detainee citizen is transferred for criminal
prosecution.414 But there was no evidence that a foreign state sought Doe
for this purpose. Similarly, the Government’s justification that Doe
travelled to a battlefield in Syria did not give it the power to transfer a
citizen.415 An alternative for these kinds of transfers would be if the
detainee, even a citizen, were held pursuant to the laws of war as an enemy
combatant. The court of appeals noted that this finding had not been clearly
shown, so the transfer could not occur. It refuted the notion that a good faith
determination of an enemy combatant was sufficient for Doe. On this issue,
eight justices in Hamdi denied that such determinations could keep citizens
detained for the conflict.416
Second, Doe v. Mattis places military detentions, including transfers,
clearly within the ambit of Hamdi checks, which open the door to step away
from wide executive deference.417 It explained that “Executive[] authority
to wage war as it sees fit is cabined by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hamdi.”418 Moreover, it discounted an “expansive vision of unilateral
Executive power over a U.S. citizen who ventures abroad.”419 The opinion
of the court explained there is an “absence of even a single known example
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Id.
See Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Id. (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008)).
Id. at 757.
Id. at 758-59.
See id. at 748.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 755.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

1180

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1109

of [this] unilateral power.”420 Because such a transfer would implicate
fundamental liberty interests, it must comply with Hamdi conditions, which
Congress codified in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act.421
For Hamdi conditions, detentions must conform to Congress’s force
authorization, laws of war, process requirements, and definitions of an
enemy combatant. The court of appeals held that transfer powers come
from detention powers, which permit greater review by a court.422 In this
case, it required legal authority to wage war against an enemy and
“opportunity to challenge the factual basis for his designation as an enemy
combatant.”423 Detainees are entitled to “receive notice of the factual basis
for [their] classification” and to challenge it.424 Due process requires more
than “some evidence” to justify detention.425 In sum, for “how” detentions
are challenged, Doe v. Mattis continues a path of Force Awaken set by
Hamdi. It specifically affirms habeas powers to stop transfers, and it
reinforces the need for legal findings that detainees are enemy combatants,
that detention authority flows from the AUMF, and that detainees can
challenge their classification.
C. Where Habeas Restricts Military Detention
For questions of “where” detention is subject to habeas checks, Doe v.
Mattis provides some clarity, while continuing trends from prior War on
Terror cases. In its first order affirming that the ACLU had standing to
pursue Doe’s habeas petition, the district court found that habeas did in fact
extend to detention in an undisclosed location in Iraq.426 It described the
location as “an armed conflict zone with restricted civilian access” and as a
“restricted U.S. military zone.”427 It was unconvinced that habeas did not
apply in such locations. Replying to the Government’s claim that military
areas were not subject to habeas, the court reasoned the military was
“experienced in managing such difficulties” and the military gave “no
reason why such inconvenience should outweigh . . . access to counsel []

420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Id. at 756.
Id. at 762.
Id.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004)).
See ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2017).
Id. at 55.
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requested months ago.”428 As such, courts identify practical factors—here,
the military’s experience—to support habeas extension to an extraterritorial
location.
The distinction between the location of the detention and the battlefield
is extremely important. Doe’s case was no different. And the distinction
warrants extending habeas and limiting deference to military authority. The
court of appeals goes so far as to say that its affirmation of transfer notice
does not affect “enemy combatants captured overseas in a zone of active
hostilities.”429 Doe was detained in Iraq, not at the battlefield. The court
highlighted that its ruling on detainee transfers is not a battlefield
judgment.430
Specific to habeas and transfers of detainees from an overseas location,
Doe v. Mattis provides new clarity and affirms older rules. It notes that a
citizen cannot be transferred from one overseas location to another
sovereign merely because the citizen voluntarily traveled outside the United
States.431 The Government pointed to Doe freely moving to Syria and
argued that this movement limits his protections from forcible transfer by
the United States.
Importantly, citizenship qualifies Doe v. Mattis’s location-based checks.
As such, future detentions of alien captives will have to look to prior
examples from Guantanamo and Afghanistan detentions. For those cases,
courts extended habeas to detentions on American-controlled territory in
Cuba,432 but did not do so for detentions on a leased base in Afghanistan.433
For Bagram detentions in Afghanistan, non-Afghan detainees were at one
point found to benefit from habeas.434 The reasoning was that the detainees
were taken to Afghanistan to avoid any rights protections, but eventually
these foreign detainees were released. The detainee’s status, whether as a
national of the detention’s location, an alien, or American citizen, is highly
relevant for determining “where” habeas applies.
In sum, for “where” habeas applies to military detentions, a few elements
of the doctrine have become clearer. A Force Awakens appears for citizens,
with courts using functional reasoning to extend review and courts applying
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

Id. at 60.
Doe, 889 F.3d at 749.
Id. at 764.
Id. at 748.
See supra Section I.C.
See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id.
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habeas powers to require notice for detainee transfers. Here, courts appear
disposed to defer to the Executive Branch’s detention authority when there
is congressional authorization for the conflict or when the custody is closer
to the battlefield. A Phantom Menace appears likely to continue for
similarly situated alien detainees. Habeas review does not extend to
detentions outside territory under long-term American control. Likewise,
American forces can transfer these detainees without habeas checks by
courts. This appears to be a Phantom since courts easily defer to the
Executive Branch’s military or diplomatic power.
D. When Military Detention Is Subject to Habeas Checks
Of all the factors in Doe v. Mattis, “when” habeas applies overseas is the
most clear. The first district court opinion began by mentioning Doe had
been in U.S. military custody “for over three months” and that the military
provided no “indication of how long it expect[ed] to hold” Doe.435 A month
later, the government was still unable to provide a timeline on when it
would transfer Doe.436 The court proceeded to require seventy-two hours’
notice before the government could transfer the detainee from military
custody to a foreign state. Within three days, a court could stop the transfer
of a citizen detainee held overseas to another country.
In extending habeas overseas, three months is not a bright-line test;
instead, it is used to counter the military’s “reasonable” time to determine
the detainee’s status. Boumediene437 and Hamdi438 both indicated that, on
the battlefield or at initial capture, the military had a reasonable amount of
time to determine if a captive was an enemy combatant. Stopping a citizen
detainee’s transfer, the Doe v. Mattis court of appeals noted that seven
months of detention had already transpired.439 The dissenting opinion
looked more closely at the dates and revisited the claim that courts require
habeas access within twenty-three days of detention, noting Doe’s first date
in American custody and the date he filed a habeas petition.440 Twenty-three
days is shorter than three months, but habeas was affirmed only in late
December, over three months after the United States had detained him.
These discrepancies do not explain why seven months later the Government
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 54, 56 (D.D.C. 2017).
Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195, 197 (D.D.C. 2018).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 771 (Henderson, J., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/5

2019]

DETAINING ISIS

1183

had not yet decided to charge, transfer, or keep him in military detention. In
practical terms, habeas affirmed over Doe in Iraq in late December
motivated the military and Government to examine the justification for
detention. For “when” habeas challenges detentions, Doe v. Mattis
continues the trend of placing prudential limits by respective battlefield
decisions and then affording the military reasonable time to determine who
is an enemy combatant.
Conclusion
This Article argues that prolonged detention in Doe v. Mattis illustrates:
(1) the legal ambivalences of overseas authority, specifically regarding
citizen detainees and congressional authorization for the ISIS conflict; (2)
that legal ambiguities from Guantánamo persist and facilitate this detention;
and (3) that law has a post-colonial influence on military detentions. The
normative impact of prior colonialism appears when looking at ISIS
detention in light of Guantánamo detentions since 2002. Important legal
ambiguities stand out when analyzing habeas at an undisclosed location in
Iraq (September 2017 to October 2018), habeas on an American base in
Cuba (since 2002), and the Constitution’s ambivalent role overseas ever
since addressing the spoils of a war from 1898.
On its face, Doe v. Mattis extended judicial powers—namely, habeas
review—to detention of an American citizen in Iraq.441 This gave rise to a
series of questions about court and Executive Branch power. With over a
year of detention, a court of appeals affirmed that habeas courts can stop the
transfer of a citizen in military detention,442 that such transfers are legal if
detention is pursuant to the laws of war,443 and that the Executive Branch is
not due broad deference regarding the legality of detention.444 To that end,
the Court indicated that a district court must examine issues that reach far
beyond one man’s custody.445 One such issue was whether Congress
authorized military force in 2001 or 2002 against ISIS, which did not yet
exist. Another was whether ISIS members or supporters could be classified
as enemy combatants pursuant to prior military force authorizations.
Notably, it is unknown if the facts of Doe’s capture or his past made him an
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.

See id. at 768.
See generally id.
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 758.
See id.
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enemy combatant. For Doe’s detention to be lawful, a district court needed
to make these findings. In December of 2017, a district court affirmed that
habeas jurisdiction applied in Iraq, three months after detention began.446
Since then, broader legal issues developed regarding judicial review,
Congress’s war powers, and Executive Branch deference in military and
foreign relations. At each stage, the Government asked for deference and
limited roles for courts. A dissenting judge from the Court Appeals agreed,
holding that Doe’s transfer was legal.447 They would most likely support
deference on a variety of other detention matters.
The post-colonial aspects of Doe v. Mattis become apparent by
identifying the doctrinal links to Guantánamo detentions. After military
responses to the September 11 attacks, the United States brought hundreds
of captives to Guantánamo. Now, seventeen years later, forty detainees
remain there in indefinite detention.448 The Guantánamo Cases generally
affirmed that military detainees could be held for the duration of the
conflict as enemy combatants and that they could benefit from the
Constitution’s habeas guarantees.449 Importantly, this rule applied to aliens
on territory the United States controlled without sovereignty. With slim
Supreme Court majorities, these cases shirked calls for executive deference.
The length of detentions then, at least two and half years for Hamdi and six
years for Boumediene, motivated the Supreme Court to craft a judicial role
to review overseas military detention.
In 2017, Doe v. Mattis picked up where these cases left off, focusing
specifically on the issue of judicial power to enjoin detainee transfers for
citizens.450 Moreover, it forced contemplation of broader issues: habeas on
non-U.S. territory, conflicts potentially distinct from prior conflicts, ISIS
connections to Al Qaeda, and Congress’s role in authorizing detention.
Similar to the Guantánamo Cases, Doe v. Mattis emphasized practical
factors and the duration of detention to affirm that courts could review
habeas petitions from overseas military detainees.451
446. See ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2017).
447. See Doe, 889 F.3d at 770 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
448. As of March 2019, forty detainees remain on the base. See A History of the Detainee
Population, N.Y. TIMES: THE GUANTÁNAMO DOCKET, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
projects/guantanamo (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). Regarding indefinite detention, see N.Y.
Times Editorial, supra note 59.
449. See supra Part I.
450. See Doe, 889 F.3d 745.
451. See id. at 751.
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Deconstructing the history of detentions, this Article begins to chart a
doctrinal path, not yet fully developed, for habeas as War on Terror
detentions approach a second decade. It identifies a spectrum of future
detention options after Doe’s release. On one end are long-term detainees
without any judicial or congressional transparency, i.e., a Phantom Menace.
At the other end is transparency of detainee treatment and the incorporation
of Congress and courts in forming detention policy, i.e., the Force
Awakens.
Like with Guantánamo before 2004, a Phantom Menace would shield
detentions from habeas courts and emphasize executive deference. Doe v.
Mattis contributes to this option in three potential ways. First, the biggest
worry from Doe v. Mattis is that a citizen was in detention without any
charge or merits proceedings for over a year. A court did not rule on this
issue specifically, but Doe’s experience will serve as an example in the
future when the military wants to confine an American. Second, this
detention could lead to expansive interpretations of the AUMF. If courts,
the Executive Branch, or Congress interpret the AUMF from 2001 or 2002
without geographical or temporal limits, military detentions would face far
less judicial scrutiny. In 2017, Doe, allegedly an ISIS member, was
captured in Syria and detained in Iraq. These facts could support a liberal
reading of the AUMF and point to the legality of Doe’s detention. This
interpretation would implicitly authorize executive military detention
anywhere and without any endpoint. Already, the United States’s
involvement in the ISIS conflict is global and far beyond Syria or Iraq,
including Yemen, Niger, and Somalia.452 Third, these disputes could lead to
similarly expansive definitions for the scope of detention for enemy
combatants. Hamdi and Guantánamo habeas cases defined these
parameters, but mostly in situations different from Doe. Then, Al Qaeda
and the Taliban were legally recognized as enemies—ISIS did not yet exist
452. The United States has recently used or is currently using military forces in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Niger. This is based on disclosed
versions of the 2018 “War Powers Report” that the Administration provides, which reports
on the legal and policy frameworks guiding the use of the military. See Matthew Kahn,
Document: White House Legal and Policy Frameworks for Use of Military Force, LAWFARE
(Mar. 14, 2018, 9:01 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/document-white-house-legal-andpolicy-frameworks-use-military-force. While parts of the report are not disclosed, it has been
reported that it mentioned a previously undisclosed ISIS and United States encounter in
Niger on or about December 6, 2017. See Allison Murphy & Scott R. Anderson, We Read
the New War Powers Report So You Don’t Have To, LAWFARE (Mar. 14, 2018 5:37 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/we-read-new-war-powers-report-so-you-dont-have.
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and lacked enemy status. Further, courts reviewed the facts about detainee
combatant roles in Hamdi, and the conflicts it addressed were closer in time
to the 2001 AUMF.
If courts interpret past force authorization as encompassing ISIS and
Syria, then the legal means to authorize indefinite detention seem more
certain. This approach tracks traditional justifications from past empires.
Historically, empires would legally justify war, occupation, and colonialism
with an open-ended classification of savages, who consequently received
fewer legal protections.453 Arguably, the enemy-combatant classification
could serve this purpose, especially if the 2001 AUMF has no limits in
terms of enemies, time, or place.
The clearest example of detention’s Phantom Menace appears when
comparing Doe to the thousands of other ISIS detainees in the region.
Enemy-combatant classification and the AUMF are now a grey area with
mounting concerns that detentions actually fuel ISIS recruitment. 454
Similarly, allies in the ISIS campaign and the United States are not
accepting detainees who are or have been recognized as their citizens.
From a different perspective, Doe v. Mattis exemplifies the Force
Awakens with increased legal process for detainees. Aside from Doe, the
most transparent developments are that the United States has brought some
citizen detainees, alleged to be ISIS supporters or members, to domestic
courts for criminal proceedings.455 In terms of the detention authority and
legal process, this is far less ambiguous than Doe’s predicament.
Otherwise, Doe’s legal fight resulted in three positive judicial results
regarding citizenship, time, and the laws-of-war framework. First, habeas
powers were clearly extended to an American citizen and this included the
ability to enjoin their transfer to another country.456 Second, the length of
detention without attorney access and without the opportunity to contest
453. For a description of how Hamdi's use of the term "enemy combatants" lacked much
prior use or definition, see Jenny S. Martinez, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 98 AM. J.
INT’L L. 782, 785–87 (2004). International law historically and in the War on Terror has
employed terms like combatants and "savages" to justify detention and force. ANTONY
ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–4 (2005);
Frédéric Mégret, From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: A Postcolonial Look at
International Humanitarian Law’s ‘Other’, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 265,
298–301 (Anne Orford ed., 2006); See Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The
Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L LAW J. 201 (2001).
454. See supra note 62.
455. See Nakashima & Ryan, supra note 397.
456. See Doe, 889 F.3d 745.
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combatant classification encouraged the application of extraterritorial
habeas.457 This holding is consistent with similar justifications in the
Guantánamo Cases. And the military’s means to administer proceedings
bolster these jurisdictional findings. Accordingly, habeas would not apply
in battlefield settings or when an individual is detained for only a short
period. This reflects increased transparency and the likelihood that future
courts will review detention.
Third, and most importantly, was the court’s categorical reasoning that
Doe’s detention had to comply with the laws-of-war framework.458 For the
detainee, this provides a process to challenge enemy-combatant
classifications. It makes detention legal only if the conflict persists—not
indefinitely. For this reason, how courts determine the scope and duration
of any AUMF is crucial, potentially risking endless detention. This
framework also diminishes when the Executive Branch receives deference
in its determination for any habeas requirements. Similarly, the framework
requires finding whether Congress envisioned actors like ISIS to be enemy
combatants per an AUMF. By looking to congressional intent, this
approach prevents the Executive Branch from unilaterally deciding the
parameters of extended military detention.
Doe v. Mattis does not provide a conclusion for how the law of military
detention changes with ISIS or with conflicts in Syria and beyond. Even if
courts made broad doctrinal findings on the legality of detention, transfer,
or release, the facts at hand preclude any extensive legal confirmation. The
United States’s limited role in ISIS detentions so far and John Doe’s
purported involvement with ISIS, in Syria, and in other locations likely
make this scenario somewhat isolated.
In TWAIL terms, Doe v. Mattis shows how overseas authority re-adapts
to suit the strategic needs of empire. With Guantánamo, territorial
occupation suited the needs of detentions distanced from legal protections
that would apply on domestic territory. The demands of American national
security modified an anomalous legal zone, which was created in 1898.
After the Guantánamo Cases, detention law supported wartime,459 with
judicial deference and congressional and executive choices keeping
detainees there. Many still remain in Cuba, seventeen years after detentions
began, despite constitutional privileges affirmed in Hamdi and Boumediene.
457. Id. at 749; ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 54, 56 (D.D.C. 2017).
458. See Doe, 889 F.3d at 759.
459. See DUDZIAK, supra note 218.
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In Doe v. Mattis, which scrutinized detention in Iraq, overseas habeas
inquiries did not focus on territory and aliens like they did for Guantánamo.
The dispute reflected later debates about military detentions in the ISIS
conflict. It remains to be seen if the ISIS conflict is legally authorized by
the 2001 or 2002 AUMFs. With Doe released in Bahrain, Doe v. Mattis
dodged this larger legal issue and the Hamdi protections that would be
afforded to an enemy combatant detainee.
Regardless, significant legal findings in Doe v. Mattis help chart the
parameters for how American detentions adapt to new locations, different
enemies, and conflicts without an end. Already, American involvement in
the ISIS conflict is extensive in Central Asia, the Middle East, Arabian
Peninsula, North Africa, and Eastern Africa.460 The means for American
constitutional law to adapt overseas becomes more apparent when
comparing Doe’s experience with trends on Guantánamo. One course this
path may take—when the Force Awakens—emphasizes transparency and
participation from multiple government branches in crafting how law
regulates detentions. For this path, the three branches of government look to
habeas and citizen protections, reviews for prolonged detentions, and a lawof-war framework that requires detainee challenges and that prohibits
indefinite detention. The court of appeals bolstered this force by rejecting
broad deference to the executive and requiring that detentions conform to
an AUMF. Taking the form of a Phantom Menace, another path might
prioritize unilateral Executive Branch authority. This path could draw
inspiration for future detentions from Doe’s confinement for over a year
without any release, charge, or proceeding on the merits of his detention.
Further, it would define detention authority broadly, relying on
interpretations of the 2001 AUMF as inclusive of later conflicts with no
effective limits for classifying enemies. Habeas courts that side with
national security or foreign relations deference would fuel this path. In
conclusion, as the War on Terror approaches its second decade, habeas
courts will confront a Phantom Menace and a Force Awaken when deciding
who can be detained and how, where, and when this detention can be
checked.

460. See Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9, at 26 (quoting Authority to Use
Military Force in Libya: Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General, supra note 370).
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